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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDREN’S WELL-BEING 
By 
XILIN ZHOU 
August 2015 
Committee Chair: Dr. Rusty Tchernis  
Major Department: Economics  
 
This dissertation explores issues on women’s employment and children’s health in 
economics.  
In chapter I, I investigate the causal effects of maternal employment on childhood 
obesity. Empirical analysis of the effects of maternal employment on childhood obesity is 
complicated by the endogeneity of mother’s labor supply. A mother’s decision to work likely 
reflects underlying factors – such as ability and motivation – that could directly influence child 
health outcomes. To address this concern, this study implements an instrumental variables (IV) 
strategy which utilizes exogenous variation in maternal employment coming from the youngest 
sibling’s school eligibility. With data on children ages 7-17 from the 1979 cohort of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth linked to the Child Supplement, I explore the effects of maternal 
employment on children’s BMI z-score and probabilities of being overweight and obese. OLS 
estimates indicate a moderate association, consistent with the prior literature. However, the IV 
estimates show that an increase in mothers’ labor supply leads to large weight gains among 
children, suggesting that not addressing the endogeneity of maternal employment leads to 
underestimated causal effects.   
	Chapter II examines the effects of Walmart Supercenters on household and child food 
insecurity. Walmart Supercenters may reduce food insecurity by lowering food prices and 
expanding food availability. Our food insecurity-related outcomes come from the 2001-2007 
waves of the December Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement. We match these 
data to our hand-collected data of Walmart Supercenters at the census tract-level. First, we 
estimate a naïve linear probability model and find that households and children who live near 
Walmart Supercenters are more likely than others to be food insecure. Since the location of 
Walmart Supercenters might be endogenous, we then turn to instrumental variables models that 
utilize the predictable geographic expansion patterns of Walmart Supercenters outward from 
Walmart’s corporate headquarters. The IV estimates suggest that the causal effect of Walmart 
Supercenters is to reduce food insecurity among households and children. The effect is largest 
among low-income families. 
In the third paper, I investigate the effects of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 
on women’s labor market outcomes. The FMLA is a federal policy that aims to help workers 
balance job and family responsibilities. However, it may have unintended consequences on 
employment because it imposes costs on firms. In this study, I investigate the impact of the 
FMLA with labor market flows—i.e., hires, separations and recalls. Focusing on labor market 
flow outcomes is crucial to identifying the immediate impact of the policy because employment 
and wages adjust slowly when there is a policy change while labor market flows are flexible. 
Using data from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators and adopting a triple-difference model, I get 
results that are unlikely to be interpreted as causal because the data are insufficient to obtain 
precise estimates. However, the idea of using labor market flows can be easily applied to a broad 
range of topics relate to workplace mandates.
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CHAPTER I: MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY: 
EVIDENCE USING INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES RELATED TO SIBLING SCHOOL 
ELIGIBILITY1 
1. Introduction 
The statistics on childhood obesity in the U.S. are alarming. From 1971 to 2010, the 
childhood obesity rate rose from 5 percent to 17 percent. The increase is especially notable 
among school-aged children, as the obesity rate quadrupled for children ages 6 to 11 and tripled 
for those ages 12 to 19, compared to doubling for those ages 2 to 5 (Fryar, Carroll, and Ogden, 
2012). The prevalence of obesity among children is considered a major public health concern 
because of its immediate and long-term effects on health and well-being. According to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), obese children are at a higher risk of 
developing cardiovascular disease, prediabetes, bone and joint problems, sleep apnea, and 
psychological problems. Obese children are also likely to grow up as obese adults and therefore 
face the risk of adult obesity-related health problems.2 Obesity imposes substantial costs on 
society. The annual medical costs of treating childhood obesity is $14.1 billion for outpatient 
costs and $237.6 million for inpatient costs. The estimated cost for treating obese adults is $147 
billion per year. In addition, obesity is also associated with indirect costs such as unfavorable 
labor market outcomes. 
Another remarkable trend in the second half of the 20th Century was increased 
employment among women. From 1960 to 2010, the labor force participation rate (LFPR) of 
women increased by more than 50 percent. A similar pattern is observed among mothers, as the 
LFPR for mothers with children under age 18 increased by 42 percent from 1975 to 2010 (U.S. 
																																																								
1	This research was conducted using restricted data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The views expressed in this 
paper do not reflect those of the BLS. Any errors are mine.	
2 http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/obesity/facts.htm 
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Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014). The concurrent nature of these trends has led researchers to ask 
whether the rise in female labor force participation could have contributed to the increase in 
childhood obesity.  
Theoretically, the effect of maternal employment on children’s development is 
ambiguous. Maternal labor supply could benefit children via increased income, or adversely 
affect them due to reduced supervision and less time for home food production (Cawley and Liu, 
2012; Duncan, Ziol-Guest, and Kalil, 2010; Fertig, Glomm, and Tchernis, 2009; Sztainer et al., 
2003; Yeung, Linver, and Brooks-Gunn, 2002). This ambiguity underscores the need for 
empirical evidence when assessing the impacts of maternal work on outcomes such as childhood 
obesity.  
Such empirical analyses, however, are complicated by the endogeneity of maternal 
employment. A mother’s unobserved characteristics – such as general ability level, preferences, 
and motivation – likely affect both her labor supply and child care decisions. This creates the 
potential for biased estimates of the effects of maternal employment on child health outcomes. 
To address the endogeneity concern, this study implements an instrumental variables strategy. 
The approach is based on the idea that the opportunity cost of maternal employment is 
substantially reduced when the youngest child is attending school, potentially increasing a 
mother’s labor supply. Cascio (2009) and Gelbach (2002) established that free public schooling 
has a significant effect on maternal employment. Mothers increase labor supply when their 
youngest child enrolls in public school. Mothers with younger children, however, exhibit no 
employment response when one of the older siblings starts attending school. Observational data 
also show that LFPR of women with older children has consistently been larger than that of 
	 3
women with younger children, with a particularly large jump occurring when the youngest child 
becomes eligible for kindergarten.3   
Specifically, I use two instrumental variables for mother’s labor supply. The first 
instrument is an indicator for the kindergarten eligibility of the mother’s youngest child. Since 
some children may not enroll in full-time school until first grade, the second instrument is a 
binary variable indicating whether the youngest child is eligible for first grade. Data come from 
the restricted-access version of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort 
(NLSY79), linked to the NLSY79 Child and Young Adult Supplement. The sample is restricted 
to school-aged children with younger siblings, with identification coming from the youngest 
sibling’s school eligibility status. This ensures that the school eligibility of sample children is not 
changing during the sample period. Using the sample of school-aged children, I first find that 
mother’s work hours are associated with positive but small increases in children’s BMI z-score 
and probabilities of being overweight and obese. These results are consistent with much of the 
existing literature. I then implement the instrumental variables strategy in an attempt to obtain 
causally interpretable evidence. The results from the IV estimates, both with and without child 
fixed effects, suggest that an increase in mother’s work leads to much larger weight gains among 
children than those suggested by the naïve specification without instruments. The point estimates 
indicate that a mother working ten more hours per week significantly increases the BMI z-score 
of her children by 0.07-0.35 points and the probability of being overweight by 4-6 percentage 
points. The point estimates for obesity are around 5-8 percentage points. These estimates are 
between two and twenty-seven times larger than the corresponding OLS results. Prior studies 
may therefore have underestimated the extent to which the rise in female labor force 
participation has contributed to the childhood obesity epidemic.  
																																																								
3 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014) and Morrill (2011). 
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2. Literature review 
Some important changes occur when mothers increase their labor supply that could 
influence childhood obesity. Research finds that working mothers cook less than other mothers, 
and that their children eat more away-from-home meals. Working mothers also spend less time 
doing physical activities with children. Their children have less supervision and watch TV much 
longer (Fertig, Glomm, and Tchernis, 2009; Cawley and Liu, 2012). Although there is some 
evidence of offsetting behavior by fathers, it is not nearly enough to offset the changes by 
mothers (Cawley and Liu, 2012).  
Accordingly, several studies document a positive relationship between maternal 
employment and childhood weight problems. Seminal work by Anderson et al. (2003) measures 
the effect of a mother’s work over the lifetime of a child on childhood obesity. They find no 
evidence that a mother’s number of weeks worked is associated with the probability a 3-11 years 
old child is obese. They do, however, find evidence of an effect on the intensive margin: an extra 
ten hours per week during weeks worked increases the probability of a child being obese by 
around one percentage point (with the exact magnitude varying slightly across specifications). 
The impact is largest for higher socioeconomic status (SES) children.  
Subsequent studies also indicate positive associations between mothers’ labor supply and 
childhood obesity. Ruhm (2008) finds that an extra 20 hours of weekly employment is predicted 
to raise obesity (overweight) by 1.6-2.7 (3-4.5) percentage points. Courtemanche (2009) 
estimates that a mother working 10 additional hours per week increases a child’s probability of 
being obese by 1.6 percentage points, while a mother’s spouse’s work hours have no effect. 
Fertig et al. (2009) find that a 10% increase in mothers’ work hours is associated with 
approximately a 1.6 percentage point rise in the probability a child is obese. Liu et al. (2009) 
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show that full-time working mothers raise a child’s BMI by about 0.581 units and probability of 
being obese by 12.3%. Morrissey et al. (2011) and Morrissey (2012) estimate that every period4 
a mother is employed is associated with increases in her child’s BMI Z-score of 0.02 and 0.03, 
respectively.  
While the existing literature has therefore provided robust evidence of a small positive 
association between maternal work and childhood obesity, the extent to which these associations 
reflect causal effects remains an open question. For instance, if ambitious, highly-skilled women 
are both more likely to enter the labor force and to carefully monitor their children’s eating and 
exercise habits, the estimated effect of maternal work on childhood obesity would be 
understated. On the other hand, if entering the labor market reflects an underlying preference for 
income versus family time, the estimate could be overstated. Reverse causality is another 
possible concern. Having a child with health problems may cause a mother to either exit the 
labor force to care for the child or enter the labor force to obtain health insurance or extra 
income. Measurement error in reported work hours is another potential source of bias. This 
would attenuate the estimated effects if the amount of reporting error is random. Some of the 
papers in the literature have implemented panel data methods to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity (Anderson et al., 2003; Courtemanche, 2009; Miller, 2011; Morrissey et al., 2011), 
but these methods do not account for time-varying sources of bias, reverse causality, or 
measurement error. Anderson et al. (2003) also estimated an IV specification, using as 
instruments state-level variables including unemployment rate, child care regulations, wages of 
child care workers, welfare benefit levels, and the status of welfare reform in the state. However, 
these instruments were relatively weak in terms of their predictive power on maternal work. 
																																																								
4 A period refers to a data collection period. If a mother answers affirmatively for her employment status during an 
interview, she is considered as employed for a period. 
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They also relied on questionable exclusion restrictions, as the instruments could influence 
childhood obesity through pathways besides maternal work.5 Further investigation is therefore 
necessary. 
I contribute to the literature by implementing an IV method that aims to produce causally 
interpretable evidence on the effect of maternal work on childhood obesity. My approach 
exploits plausibly exogenous variation in maternal labor supply coming from the timing of 
school eligibility of the youngest child of a mother. The idea behind the instruments comes from 
Morrill (2011). She uses a binary indicator for kindergarten eligibility of the youngest child in 
the family to instrument for maternal labor supply. Her outcome variables are acute health 
conditions that could arise when mothers are working, including hospitalizations, asthma 
episodes, injuries, and poisonings. She finds that maternal employment substantially increases 
the risk of all these health incidents. In contrast, I focus on a chronic health condition: childhood 
obesity.  
3. Methodology  
The effect of maternal employment on childhood weight status can be estimated by the 
following model for child ݅ in year ݐ: 
ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐܵݐܽݐݑݏ௜௧ ൌ α ൅ βܯܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ γ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߪ௦ ൅ ߝ௜௧	         (1) 
where children’s weight status is the outcome of interest, ܯܮܵ is maternal labor supply, 
ܺ is a set of demographic characteristics of both the child and mother, and ߬ and ߪ represent year 
and state fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β, which indicates the effect of maternal 
employment on children’s weight status. 
																																																								
5 For instance, unemployment rate and the generosity of a state’s welfare program could be associated with changes 
in household disposable income or wealth even if mothers’ work hours do not change, and this in turn could affect 
children’s weight.  
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Estimating this reduced form equation may generate inconsistent results due to the 
endogeneity problem of maternal labor supply. Abilities, preferences, and motivation of a mother 
could affect both her work decision and her child care quality. If maternal employment reflects 
these unobserved factors, the sample of working mothers may not be a random selection of 
mother population. As a first attempt to address this issue, I add child fixed effects to equation 
(1). Fixed effects will account for time-invariant unobservables, but they do not correct for time-
varying unobservables, reverse causality, or measurement error in the independent variable of 
interest. Without addressing all sources of endogeneity bias, estimates of β do not reflect the 
causal effect of maternal employment on child obesity. 
A possible solution to the problems stated above is IV estimation. In this study, I use two 
instrumental variables for maternal employment, both of which are constructed based on the age 
of the youngest child of a mother. The first one is a binary variable indicating whether the 
youngest child is eligible for public kindergarten. In the U.S., children age five or older are 
eligible to attend free public kindergarten. Kindergarten eligibility of the youngest child 
substantially reduces the opportunity cost of a mother’s working, providing an incentive for the 
rise in maternal employment. This instrument captures a particular discrete jump in maternal 
labor supply that is documented by Morrill (2011). However, there is a reason to suspect that the 
increase in maternal labor supply from children reaching school age does not entirely occur at 
kindergarten. In many states, public kindergarten is either not mandatory or only lasts a half day. 
As of 2012, only 16 states mandated kindergarten attendance among age-eligible children, and 
only 12 states were required to offer a full-day kindergarten program while another 34 states 
required half-day kindergarten.6 It is therefore possible that another discrete jump in maternal 
labor force participation or working hours occurs when the youngest child becomes eligible for 
																																																								
6 http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_3.asp 
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first grade. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, In 1980s and 1990s, 
although 85-89 percentage of age-eligible children enrolled in kindergarten, only 30-50 
percentage were enrolled full-day.7 Therefore, for a fair amount of mothers first grade might be 
the time at which the youngest child is able to attend school for a full day. I therefore use as a 
second instrument a binary variable equals to the eligibility for the first grade of the youngest 
child.8  
A child’s public schooling has been found to have significant predictive power on 
maternal labor supply (Cascio 2009; Fitzpatrick, 2012; Gelbach, 2002; Morrill, 2011). However, 
children’s actual school enrollment age is endogenous because it is determined not only by state 
legislation but also by parents’ willingness to enroll their children, as “redshirting” is popular 
(Anderson et al., 2011). Therefore, the predicted school enrollment age, instead of the actual 
school attending age, is a preferred instrument since it provides an intent-to-treat effect for 
maternal labor supply. 
Using these instruments requires the assumption that they do not affect children’s weight 
through any pathways other than maternal labor supply. An obvious concern is that the change in 
school eligibility of a youngest child may have a direct effect on his/her own health (Anderson et 
al., 2011; Zhang and Zhang, 2011). To improve the validity of the instruments, I therefore 
restrict the sample to the older children (aged 7 to 17) in the family whose school eligibility 
status remains the same when their youngest sibling enters school. The IV estimator evaluates 
the local average treatment effect (LATE) of maternal employment for school-aged children 
whose mother’s employment was previously constrained by child care responsibilities. 
																																																								
7 https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_202.10.asp 
8 Another discrete jump could occur with pre-kindergarten, which serves 4 years old children. However, unlike 
kindergarten and first grade, pre-kindergarten is not free and not universally available in many states. Cascio (2009) 
and Fitzpatrick (2010) find limited impact of pre-kindergarten on women’s labor supply.	
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Identification of the instrumental variables estimation comes from variations in the date 
of birth (DOB) of the youngest child and the state-specific cutoff date for kindergarten and first 
grade eligibility. The first source of variation means that two otherwise identical children have 
mothers facing different incentives to work as a result of the age of the youngest sibling. One 
child’s mother may be working since the youngest sibling is six years old while the other child’s 
mother may not be working because the youngest sibling is four years old. Even if the two 
children have youngest siblings of the same age, there could be variation in public school 
eligibility if they live in different states. In the U.S., individual states have the authority to 
determine the cutoff dates by which a child must have turned 5 (6) years old in order to be 
eligible to enroll in kindergarten (first grade). Assume two youngest siblings both born on 
September 15th 2005, but one of them lives in Georgia and one lives in Louisiana. They will turn 
5 years old on September 15th 2010. However, the one in Louisiana can go to kindergarten in 
2010 because he/she fulfills the age requirement before the September 30th cutoff; while the one 
in Georgia has to wait for the next year since the child is still four years old on the cutoff date of 
September 1st in 2010. The cutoff dates of school-year vary across states and also change during 
the sample period. The combination of the DOB and cutoff dates therefore generates substantial 
variation. 
The IV model takes the following form:  
ܯܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ߙிௌ ൅ ߜிௌܼ௜௧ ൅ ߛிௌ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߬ிௌ௧ ൅ ߪிௌ௦ ൅ ߭௜௧         (2)                            
ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐܵݐܽݐݑݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙௌௌ ൅ ߚୗୗܯܮ෣ܵ௜௧ ൅ ߛௌௌ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߬ௌௌ௧ ൅ ߪௌௌ௦ ൅ ߝ௜௧        (3)      
Equation (2) gives the first stage regression, with coefficients denoted by the ܨܵ 
subscript, while equation (3) is the second stage regression, with coefficients having the ܵܵ 
subscript. ܼ௜௧ indicates the two instrumental variables. I estimate the model both with and 
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without child fixed effects, which I refer to as the IV-FE specification and the IV specification, 
respectively. The IV-FE model goes further than the IV model toward accounting for 
endogeneity bias, as it controls for possible unobserved heterogeneity in fertility patterns. 
However, the IV model is likely more efficient than the IV-FE specification. We therefore 
present and discuss results from both models.     
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
Data come from the restricted version of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
Cohort (NLSY79). The original sample of the NLSY79 contains 12,682 individuals, half male 
and half female, who were between the ages of 14 and 21 in 1979. These individuals were 
followed annually from 1979 to 1994 and then biannually through 2010. Starting in 1986, a 
supplemental survey, the NLSY79 Child and Young Adult (NLSCYA), was conducted 
biannually. It includes assessments of all biological children of the original female participants. 
Information was collected from either the mother or the child9, and it can be linked to the main 
NLSY79 through the mother’s identifier. I use the matched mother-children records from all 
waves in which both the NLSY79 and the NLSCYA are available, i.e. biannually from 1986 to 
2010. 
There are three outcomes of interest, BMI z-score (BMIZ) and indicators for overweight 
and obesity, all of which are constructed based on children’s BMI10. BMI is a commonly-used 
proxy for body fat in adults. However, it is not a proper measure for adiposity in children due to 
biological reasons. Therefore, the CDC suggests using BMIZ instead of BMI for children. BMIZ 
is a standardized measure of BMI using age-and-gender specific BMI distributions from the 
2000 growth chart (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002). The main advantage of BMIZ is 
																																																								
9 Before 1994, a mother reported information for all her children regardless of the age of children. After 1994, 
children above 15 years of age answered interview questions by themselves. 
10 BMI is calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared (kg/m2). 
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that it is comparable across age and sex. The other two outcomes are also computed according to 
the 2000 growth chart. If a child’s BMI is above the 85th (95th) percentile of the BMI distribution 
of the corresponding reference population, the child is considered overweight (obese).  
Maternal employment is computed using the week-by-week array of the complete work 
history for each participant. The longitudinal work history data in the NLSY79 include an 
indicator for whether the participant is working and the number of working hours in each week 
from January 1, 1978 to the latest interview date11. Utilizing work history data, I construct 
employment in a retrospective manner during two time spans12: a month (4 weeks) before the 
interview and a year (52 weeks) prior to the interview. In each time span maternal employment is 
assessed by two variables: the fraction of weeks employed13 and the average hours worked per 
week. There are therefore four measures of maternal labor supply, and I use each of them 
separately in a single regression.14 Using one-month labor supply variables captures the 
immediate impact of maternal employment on child weight, while using one-year variables 
captures a slightly more cumulative effect. Some papers in the literature estimate an even more 
cumulative effect by measuring maternal work as average work hours over the course of the 
child’s entire life (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Courtemanche, 2009). My IV strategy – which 
relies on sharp discontinuities at a particular age – is inherently better suited for the identification 
																																																								
11 See the NLSY79 codebook supplement for more information: 
http://www.bls.gov/nls/79quex/r19/y79r19append18.pdf 
12 The NLSY79 provides two sets of ready-to-use employment measures: employment since date of last interview 
and employment in last calendar year. Despite that these measures are easily accessible, they are not able to capture 
the abrupt change in employment at the point when the youngest child is eligible to kindergarten. In addition, some 
participants may have skipped one or more waves of interview, thus result in imprecise measurements of 
employment since date of last interview. 
13 For example, if a mother works 3 weeks in the month before the interview, then she works 75 percent of the time. 
The advantage of using the fraction of weeks worked, in contrast to using the number of weeks worked, is that it 
makes the scale of the variables comparable across the two time spans. 
14 I considered including two or more of these measures together in the same regression, but I was unable to find a 
set of instruments that was strong enough to precisely identify the impacts of multiple endogenous variables. 
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of short-run rather than long-run impacts. It is therefore noteworthy that, despite this limitation, I 
will still obtain much larger effects than these prior studies.  
A key component to this analysis is the use of instrumental variables. The restricted 
NLSY79 has not only the DOB of all children but also their states of residence. I first calculate 
the age in weeks for the youngest child in each household. Then the first IV, an indicator for 
whether the youngest sibling is eligible for kindergarten, is given by whether the youngest child 
reaches 260 weeks of age (5 years old) before his/her state of residence’s cutoff date for the 
school year. State cutoff dates come from Evans et al. (2010). The second IV, an indicator for 
first grade eligibility, equals one if the youngest child is 312 weeks of age (6 years old) before 
the cutoff date.  
I also utilize the extensive information available in the NLSY79 to include a set of 
demographic control variables. These include gender, race/ethnicity (Hispanic, African 
American, and others15), whether the child had a high birth weight (> 8.8 pounds)16, whether the 
child was breastfed, child’s age in years, family income, and family size (one to three persons, 
four persons, and five or more persons). Regressions also control for the mother’s age, the 
mother’s AFQT score, education level of the mother (less than high school, high school 
graduate, some college, and college degree or higher education), and whether the mother is 
married and lives with a spouse. I also use limited information available in the NLSCYA for 
father to construct an indicator for close child-father attachment (equals one if father lives in the 
household, father lives within 10 miles, or child has seen father at least once a week in the past 
year). In addition, self-reported data on height and weight usually suffer from systematic 
reporting error that leads to underestimation of the prevalence of obesity (Goodman, Hinden, and 
																																																								
15 Other races include those who identify themselves as nonblack/non-Hispanic. 
16 The threshold of high birth weight can be found 
http://www.cdc.gov/pednss/what_is/pednss_health_indicators.htm	
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Khandelwal, 2000; Kuczmarski, Kuczmarski, and Najjar, 2001). I thus add indicators for 
whether height or weight are self-reported17 in all specifications.   
The regression sample is restricted to children who meet three criteria: 1) they are seven 
to seventeen years old, 2) they have at least one younger sibling, and 3) their youngest sibling’s 
schooling eligibility changed during the sample period. The first restriction ensures that school 
eligibility does not change for the sample children. As discussed above, this eliminates the 
obvious concern that one’s own school eligibility could affect one’s own weight for reasons 
other than maternal employment. The second restriction is necessary for the use of IVs. The third 
restriction is used to eliminate those whose mothers never receive the treatment induced by the 
IVs. I name the resulting sample the “main sample”.18  
Since employing several sample restrictions raises obvious concerns about external 
validity, I also prepare two alternative samples with fewer constraints. One alternative is called 
the “extended sample”. This sample only restricts the age of the focal children; it does not 
employ the second and third restrictions. The other alternative, named the “comparison sample”, 
is the same as the extended sample but only includes 1986 to 1996 – the years used by Anderson 
et al. (2003). This enables assessment of whether differences in our results and theirs could 
simply be attributable to the longer sample period. 
The main sample includes 16,535 observations from 4,119 children of 2,575 mothers. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main sample, with all estimates weighted by the 
																																																								
17 The interview questions concerning the measurements of height and weight change frequently during the research 
period. There were only two modes at the beginning: mother report and interviewer measure. The questions evolved 
gradually and eventually there are four options: mother report, child report, interviewer measure, and others. In 
addition, young adults who are above age 15 were interviewed independently since 1996. Their height and weight 
data are all self-reported. To simplify the classifications, I create an indicator which represents all modes except 
interviewer measure for height and weight data and call it self-reported mode. 
18 Other steps to improve data quality include dropping children with extreme BMIs (z-score exceeding +/-5), 
children who have shrinking height from the previous interview, children who do not live with their mothers, female 
children who are pregnant or ever have given birth, and those whose mothers do not have any valid employment 
data.  
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children’s sampling weights. The average BMI z-score is 0.29, and 27% of the children are 
overweight while 12% of them are obese. On average, the fractions of weeks that mothers 
worked in the past month and in the past year are both 65%, equivalent to 2.6 weeks and 33.8 
weeks, respectively. The average hours worked per week is around 23.2, both for employment 
measured in a month and in a year. One concern about the data quality is for family income. In 
the sample about 14% of children do not have income data. I impute missing values of income as 
the sample mean, and I add an indicator for observations if income is imputed in all regressions 
to mitigate bias. 
The extended sample has a larger sample size of 34,939 observations, and the comparison 
sample has a smaller size of 15,602 observations. Table 18 in Appendix A shows the summary 
statistics for the main, extended, and the comparison samples. The key characteristics in the two 
alternative samples are similar to those from the main sample. The extended sample has a BMIZ 
of 0.35 and 29% (13%) overweight (obese) children, while the comparison sample has a BMIZ 
of 0.24 and the same proportions of overweight and obese children as the main sample. Other 
minor differences among the three samples are as expected given the nature of the restrictions. 
For instance, the education level of mothers in the comparison sample is lower because these 
mothers were still young during 1986 and 1996 and some of them had not graduated from school 
yet.   
5. Results 
5.1 OLS estimates 
Table 2 presents the results from estimating the associations between maternal 
employment and the child weight outcomes using each of the three samples. A single cell reports 
the coefficient estimate for maternal employment from separate OLS regressions. In other words, 
	 15
the four maternal employment variables are not included together in the same regression, in 
order to retain comparability with the subsequent IV estimates.19 The first column uses the main 
sample, the second column utilizes the extended sample, and the third column uses the 
comparison sample. As discussed previously, all specifications include year and state fixed 
effects as well as children’s and mothers’ demographic controls. Estimates are weighted using 
the child sampling weights. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by 
mothers.  
The results in Table 2 indicate a positive and significant relationship between the labor 
supply of mothers and the weight status of children across different specifications. In the main 
sample, ten more work hours per week raise children’s BMIZ by 0.03-0.04 points and the 
likelihood of being overweight (obese) by 0.5-0.8 (0.3-0.4) percentage points. The weeks worked 
is also positively and significantly related to weight outcomes. Since it is measured as the faction 
of weeks a mother worked in a month or in a year, the point estimates for the one-month and one 
year measures are comparable. If a mother works one additional week (25 percent of her time) in 
a month, that will increase her children’s BMIZ by 1.6 points and the probability of being 
overweight (obese) by 0.2 (0.21) percentage points. Similarly, if a mother works one additional 
month (8 percent of her time) in a year, her children will have 0.77 points of higher BMIZ and 
0.14 (0.1) percentage points of higher likelihood of being overweight (obese). This positive and 
significant association between maternal employment and children’s weight status persists across 
the three samples. In short, Table 2 suggests that my results are not likely to differ from those 
obtained by other studies (particularly Anderson et al., 2003) merely because of differences in 
the sample. I therefore only use the main sample throughout the duration of the paper. 
																																																								
19 I also tried probit models for outcomes overweight and obesity. The results are close to the OLS estimates in 
terms of magnitude and significance. 
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5.2 IV estimates 
Using the main sample, Table 3 evaluates the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of 
child fixed effects and the use of IV. The first column in Table 3 simply reprints the first column 
of Table 2, which reports the coefficient estimate from the OLS regression with the main sample. 
Column (2) adds the child fixed effects. Interestingly, accounting for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity eliminates most of the significant associations between the maternal employment 
variables and child weight outcomes. However, the fixed effects models likely do not reveal 
causal effects, as concerns about time-variant omitted variables, reverse causality, and 
measurement error still remain. 
Column (3) reports the second-stage results of the IV model without child fixed effects. 
The coefficients for all maternal employment measures are positive and large in magnitude, 
although insignificant for BMIZ. A mother’s additional week (25 percent of her time) employed 
in the past month increases a child’s P(Overweight) by 4 percentage points, and P(Obese) by 4.5 
percentage points. Ten more work hours per week in the past month increases P(Overweight) by 
4.7 percentage points and P(Obese) by 5.2 percentage points. One more month (8 percent of her 
time) worked in the past year raises P(Overweight) by 1.2 percentage points and P(Obese) by 1.4 
percentage points. An additional ten hours worked per week over the past year increases 
P(Overweight) by 4.4 percentage points and P(Obese) by 4.9 percentage points. Compared to the 
OLS estimates without child fixed effects, the IV estimates are 2 to 4 times larger when the 
outcome is BMIZ and 6 to 21 times larger when the outcome is overweight or obesity. Despite 
the fact that the standard errors rise considerably when using IV, IV estimates for overweight and 
obesity are significant at the 5% level or better. The IV estimates for BMIZ are insignificant 
because of the large standard errors, but their magnitudes still suggest that the corresponding 
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OLS estimates are likely conservative. In short, the results using IV without child fixed effects 
suggest that maternal employment causes children to be overweight and obese, and the effect is 
larger than documented in the naïve OLS estimates.  
Column (4) presents the IV-FE estimates. This model goes the furthest toward addressing 
causality, as it addresses endogeneity bias in two ways: FE to eliminate time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity and IV to address remaining issues with time-variant omitted variable 
bias, reverse causality, or measurement error. The second-stage coefficient estimates for BMI z-
score, overweight, and obesity are all positive and large. A mother’s additional week (25 percent 
of her time) employed in the past month increases a child’s BMIZ by 0.29, P(Overweight) by 6 
percentage points, and P(Obese) by 7 percentage points. An additional ten hours per week in the 
current month raises BMIZ by 0.35, P(Overweight) by 5.5 percentage points, and P(Obese) by 
7.7 percentage points. One more month (8 percent of a mother’s time) worked in the past year 
increases BMIZ by 7.4, P(Overweight) by 0.019 percentage points, and P(Obese) by 0.02 
percentage points. An increase of ten hours per week over the past year raises BMIZ by 0.26, 
P(Overweight) by 4.3 percentage points, and P(Obese) by 5.8 percentage points. The IV-FE 
standard errors are even larger than those using IV without FE, nonetheless the effects on BMIZ 
and obesity are all significant at the 10% level or better. The magnitudes of the IV-FE estimates 
are between 14 and 157 times larger than those of the corresponding FE estimates without IV. 
Compared to the IV estimates without child FE, the IV-FE estimates are roughly four times as 
large when BMIZ is the outcome, similarly sized when overweight is the outcome, and about 
half larger when obesity is the outcome. Therefore, there is clear evidence that implementing the 
IV approach increases the estimated effects, but it is not clear whether adding FE to the IV model 
makes a meaningful difference. Importantly, the IV-FE estimates are 3 to 15 times larger than 
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those from the prior studies that used comparable specifications20 (Anderson et al., 2003; 
Courtemanche, 2009; Ruhm, 2008). In short, these comparisons suggest that insufficiently 
addressing the endogeneity problem of maternal labor supply leads to underestimation of its 
causal effect of child weight. 
5.3 Validity of IVs 
Table 4-6 present tests of the key assumptions required by the IV approach. First, the IV 
model requires that the IVs influence the endogenous labor supply variables. Table 4 therefore 
presents the first-stage coefficient estimates of interest from the IV and IV-FE models, along 
with the F statistic from a test of the joint significance of the instruments. The first-stage F-
statistic is much larger than the standard criteria of 10 in most specifications. The instruments 
therefore have sufficient predictive power to rule out a weak instrument problem. Turning to the 
individual coefficient estimates, in the IV model, the binary instrument for kindergarten 
eligibility is only significant in one of the four maternal employment specifications (fraction of 
weeks employed in the past year), whereas the  indicator for first grade eligibility is strongly 
significant in all specifications. In the IV-FE model, the indicator for kindergarten eligibility has 
strong significant coefficients in all specifications, while the indicator for first grade eligibility 
has significant coefficient only for fraction of working weeks.  
The IV strategy also assumes that the instruments can be excluded from the second stage 
regression; i.e. they only influence child weight through their effect on maternal work, 
conditional on the controls. Table 5 presents the Hansen J statistics from one test of this 
assumption: the over-identification test. Each cell represents p-values from a separate over-
identification test, where the null hypothesis is that the set of instruments is valid. The p-values 
																																																								
20 Anderson et al. (2003) find that 10 hours of additional work every week increase children’s probability to be 
obese by 1 percentage point. Courtemanche (2009) and Ruhm (2008) document a 2 percentages points of 
magnitude. 
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are all over 0.3 in the IV specifications. The p-values are never below 0.1 in the IV-FE models. 
The second test for this condition is to regress both the endogenous variable and the IVs in the 
same regression. Table 6 shows results from this test, with obesity for the outcome variable. 
While controlling for maternal employment, the coefficients for both IVs are never significant. 
In other words, I do not find clear evidence that the set of instruments is invalid. 
5.4 Subgroup analysis 
In this section, I explore the heterogeneous effects of maternal employment on child 
weight status for subgroups, with obesity as the outcome variable. I divide the main sample 
based on children’s gender, race, poverty status, and mother’s marital status. Each cell of Table 7 
reports a coefficient coming from a separate regression. I only use the IV specifications because 
insufficient subgroup sample size prevents the IV-FE models from producing precise estimates. 
The first column of Table 7 reprints the IV estimates in Table 3 for reference. Columns 
(2) and (3) record the results for girls and boys. Maternal employment has a significant and large 
impact on girls’ obesity. If a mother works 10 more hours every week in the past year, her girl 
children are 7.7 percentage points more likely to be obese. The estimates for boys are small in 
magnitude and insignificant. Column (4)-(6) disaggregate the main sample by race/ethnicity. 
Among Hispanics, blacks, and those of other races/ethnicities, maternal employment has 
significant and substantial effects on children in other races (such white, Asian, etc.). If a mother 
works 10 additional hours every week in the past year, her white children will be 6.5 percentage 
points more likely to be obese. However, the effects of maternal employment on Hispanic and 
black children are small and insignificant. The effects are even negative in sign for the latter.  
Column (7) and (8) present the results for poor and non-poor children. The NLSY79 
classifies a family as in poverty if family income over the past year below the family size 
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adjusted poverty level. Because some participants do not report their financial status, the 
subsample analysis only applied to those who have valid data for poverty status21. Compared to 
poor children, maternal employment has significant effects on children from non-poor families. 
The last two columns reports results for children with married mother and non-married mothers. 
If a mother is married and live with spouse, her employment will have a significant effects on her 
children’s obesity. Results documented in these subgroup analysis consistent to findings 
documented in other papers. Anderson et al. (2003) and Ruhm (2008) also find that maternal 
employment has a larger deleterious impact on children from high socioeconomic status families. 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
This paper explores the causal effect of maternal employment on child weight status. 
With panel data on children age seven to seventeen from the NLSY79, I first replicate previous 
research by demonstrating a small, positive association between maternal employment and 
childhood obesity. Then, I use kindergarten and first grade eligibility as instruments for maternal 
employment. IV and IV-FE models suggest that maternal employment increases children’s BMI 
z-score and probabilities of being overweight and obese. The effects are much larger once the 
endogeneity of labor supply is addressed, and they are also larger than those previously 
estimated in the literature.  
The existing literature has documented a small positive association between maternal 
work and childhood obesity. However, these studies either do not address the endogeneity of 
maternal labor supply or only partially account for unobserved heterogeneity. Prior papers on 
this topic urged further investigation with instruments for maternal employment which are valid 
and have strong predicting power (Anderson et al., 2003; Cawley and Liu, 2012; Ruhm, 2008). I 
																																																								
21 Around 2,500 observations have missing data for poverty status, thus are excluded from this group of subsample 
analysis. 
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therefore utilize an IV strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in maternal labor 
supply coming from the timing of school eligibility of the youngest child of a mother. My 
findings contribute to the literature by adding causally interpretable evidence that maternal 
employment raises the risk of children having unfavorable weight outcomes. However, the 
design of the IV strategy requires that only children who are school-aged with siblings are 
included in the sample. Therefore, the results presented here are not necessarily applicable to all 
children. Further investigation is also needed to explore how the effects might vary by 
subgroups, such as by gender, race, socioeconomic status, and by father’s work status. 
The results, however, should not be interpreted as discouraging women’s labor supply, or 
as claiming that mothers’ employment has had a negative net impact on society. My findings 
instead highlight the importance of further investigation into the mechanisms through which 
maternal employment might affect children’s health. Possible mechanisms include the changes in 
family routine, diet, and time allocation induced by mothers’ labor supply. Maternal employment 
is likely to reduce beneficial routines, such as regular family meals and physical activities with 
children. At the same time, maternal employment might lead to unhealthy routines, such as 
television watching and restaurant meals.  Prior research has found associations between 
maternal employment and time use (Cawley and Liu, 2012; Fertig et al, 2009), but causal 
evidence – perhaps using the identification strategy from this paper – is needed.  
Another possible mechanism is the child care setting. For example, if child care 
subsidies, such as the child care and development fund (CCDF), encourage working mothers to 
rely on center-based child care service, the use of non-parental child care may influence 
children’s diet and activity to some extent (Blau and Tekin, 2007; Herbst and Tekin, 2010). In 
addition, the availability of relative care, especially from grandparents, has substantial positive 
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effect on mothers’ labor supply (Compton and Pollak, 2014). Grandparents may put fewer 
restrictions on their grandchildren’s diet and activities (Maher et al., 2008), thus increasing the 
risk of children being obese.  
Understanding the mechanisms of the effects of maternal employment on childhood 
obesity is not only of academic interest, but it would also shed light on policies to help reverse 
the obesity epidemic. For example, if supervision is an important mechanism, promoting after-
school programs would be a beneficial policy. Such programs not only increase children’s 
physical activity level directly, they also help children to form healthy habits and promote health 
education among parents (Annesi et al., 2007; Annesi, Moore, & Dixon, 2008). Alternatively, if 
nutrition is the main mechanism, policies related to food labeling (Bollinger, Leslie, and 
Sorensen, 2010; Tandon et al., 2010) and quality of school meals (Foster et al., 2007; Story, 
Nanney, and Schwartz, 2009) could have a strong effect. Understanding the relative impact of 
each of the mechanisms would be the first step to inform policy makers.  
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        7. Tables 
Table 1 Summary Statistics, all estimates are weighted using the child's sampling weight. 
  Main Sample (N=16535)   
  Mean SD Min. Max. 
Children's Info 
BMI z-score 0.29 1.15 -4.98 3.12 
Overweight 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Obesity 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Height is self-report 0.51 0.5 0 1 
Weight is self-report 0.52 0.5 0 1 
Family size, less than 3 persons 4.86 1.28 1 15 
Family size, 4 persons 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Family size, 5 or more persons 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Family income, $1000 60.58 78.21 0 974.1 
Child's age, in year 12.02 3.09 7 17 
Child is Hispanic 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Child is African American 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Attachment to father 0.77 0.41 0 1 
Child is female 0.49 0.5 0 1 
High birth weight 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Breastfed 0.57 0.48 0 1 
Mother's Info. 
Edu.,less than high school 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Edu.,high school graduate 0.44 0.5 0 1 
Edu.,some college 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Edu.,college degree or higher 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Mother's age 36.64 5.42 21 53 
AFQT score (2006 standard) 47.64 28.22 0 100 
Married, live with spouse 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Mothers' Employment 
Fraction of weeks worked in past month 0.65 0.46 0 1 
Hours worked per week in past month, in unit 10 2.32 2 0 9.6 
Fraction of weeks worked in past year 0.65 0.43 0 1 
Hours worked per week in past year, in unit 10 2.32 1.9 0 9.6 
IV 
Binary if the yst child is eligible for kindergarten 0.53 0.5 0 1 
Binary if the yst child is eligible for first grade 0.46 0.5 0 1 
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Table 2 OLS estimates of the impact of maternal employment on children' weight status (robust standard 
errors in parentheses) 
Outcome Time span Maternal emp. (1) (2) (3) 
    Main Extended  Comparison 
      (N=16535) (N=34939) (N=15602) 
BMI Z-score Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.062** 0.049*** 0.054** 
    (0.024) (0.017) (0.027) 
    Hours worked per week 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
      (0.0055) (0.0038) (0.0060) 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.096*** 0.084*** 0.093*** 
    (0.027) (0.019) (0.029) 
    Hours worked per week 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
      (0.0058) (0.0041) (0.0063) 
Overweight Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.0068 0.0032 0.0056 
    (0.0091) (0.0066) (0.0097) 
    Hours worked per week 0.0045** 0.0031** 0.0036 
      (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0022) 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.017* 0.017** 0.016 
    (0.0098) (0.0072) (0.011) 
    Hours worked per week 0.0074*** 0.0069*** 0.0052** 
      (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0023) 
Obesity Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.0077 0.0087* 0.012* 
    (0.0066) (0.0049) (0.0068) 
    Hours worked per week 0.0029* 0.0037*** 0.0043*** 
      (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0016) 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.012* 0.012** 0.019** 
    (0.0070) (0.0053) (0.0074) 
    Hours worked per week 0.0044*** 0.0053*** 0.0055*** 
    (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0017) 
Note: hours worked per week is in unit 10. 
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Table 3 IV estimates with/without child FE of the impact of maternal employment on children' weight status (robust standard errors in 
parentheses) 
Outcome variable Time span Maternal emp. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      OLS FE IV IV-FE 
BMI Z-score Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.062** 0.0074 0.24 1.16** 
    (0.024) (0.024) (0.24) (0.53) 
    Hours worked per week 0.026*** 0.0039 0.069 0.35** 
      (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.072) (0.16) 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.096*** 0.049* 0.25 0.93** 
    (0.027) (0.028) (0.24) (0.38) 
    Hours worked per week 0.036*** 0.016** 0.066 0.26** 
      (0.0058) (0.0065) (0.067) (0.11) 
Overweight Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.0068 -0.0052 0.16* 0.24 
    (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.095) (0.20) 
    Hours worked per week 0.0045** -0.0024 0.047* 0.055 
      (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.028) (0.057) 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.017* 0.011 0.15 0.15 
    (0.0098) (0.011) (0.092) (0.15) 
    Hours worked per week 0.0074*** 0.0016 0.044* 0.043 
      (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.026) (0.041) 
Obesity Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.0077 0.0042 0.18** 0.29* 
    (0.0066) (0.0071) (0.071) (0.16) 
    Hours worked per week 0.0029* -0.0014 0.052** 0.077* 
      (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.021) (0.046) 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.012* 0.014 0.17** 0.21* 
    (0.0070) (0.0085) (0.068) (0.11) 
    Hours worked per week 0.0044*** 0.00080 0.049** 0.058* 
    (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.020) (0.032) 
Note: hours worked per week is in unit 10. 
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Table 4 First-stage estimate of the IV and the IV-FE models. 
Time span Maternal emp. (1) (2) (3) 
    
Kindergarten 
eligibility 
First grade 
eligibility F-test 
Panel A: IV model       
Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.020 0.093*** 54.4 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
  Hours worked per week 0.058 0.32*** 33.4 
    (0.062) (0.063)   
Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.030** 0.088*** 67.3 
  (0.014) (0.014) 
  Hours worked per week 0.073 0.34*** 42.3 
  (0.059) (0.060) 
Panel B: IV-FE model       
Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.027** 0.023* 9.7 
  (0.013) (0.013) 
  Hours worked per week 0.12** 0.044 7 
    (0.050) (0.052)   
Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.044*** 0.020* 22.3 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
  Hours worked per week 0.16*** 0.071 16 
  (0.046) (0.045) 
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Table 5 Over-identification test. Chi-sq(1) P-value are reported. 
Outcome  Time span Maternal emp. (1) 
      
Hansen J Stat. P-
value 
Panel A: IV model 
BMI Z-score Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.32 
    Hours worked per week 0.31 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.35 
    Hours worked per week 0.32 
Overweight Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.48 
    Hours worked per week 0.5 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.42 
    Hours worked per week 0.48 
Obese Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.97 
    Hours worked per week 0.99 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.85 
    Hours worked per week 0.97 
Panel B: IV-FE model 
BMI Z-score Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.41 
    Hours worked per week 0.71 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.6 
    Hours worked per week 0.6 
Overweight Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.21 
    Hours worked per week 0.14 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.14 
    Hours worked per week 0.14 
Obese Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.63 
    Hours worked per week 0.43 
  Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.43 
    Hours worked per week 0.44 
Note: hours worked per week is in unit 10. 
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Table 6 Endogenous variables and the IVs in one regression with obesity for the outcome variable. 
  Maternal emp. (1) (2) (3) 
    
Endogenous 
variable 
Kindergarten 
eligibility 
First grade 
eligibility 
Past month Fraction of weeks worked 0.0061 0.0030 0.016 
  (0.0066) (0.010) (0.011) 
  Hours worked per week 0.0026* 0.0030 0.016 
    (0.0015) (0.010) (0.011) 
Past year Fraction of weeks worked 0.010 0.0028 0.016 
  (0.0071) (0.010) (0.011) 
  Hours worked per week 0.0041** 0.0028 0.015 
  (0.0016) (0.010) (0.011) 
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Table 7 Subgroup analysis of the impact of maternal employment on children' weight status (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
Outcome Time span Maternal emp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
   
Main 
sample Girl Boy Hispanic 
African 
America 
White 
and other Poor 
Not 
poor Married 
Not 
married 
Obesity Past month 
Fraction of 
weeks worked 0.18** 0.25** 0.096 0.053 -0.063 0.24*** 0.12 0.20* 0.17** 0.14 
(0.071) (0.12) (0.088) (0.16) (0.14) (0.090) (0.13) (0.10) (0.078) (0.17) 
  
Hours worked 
per week 0.052** 0.086** 0.026 0.018 -0.018 0.073*** 0.037 0.057* 0.052** 0.043 
(0.021) (0.044) (0.024) (0.051) (0.037) (0.028) (0.038) (0.031) (0.025) (0.049) 
 
Past 
year 
Fraction of 
weeks worked 0.17** 0.23** 0.098 0.043 -0.039 0.23*** 0.16 0.21** 0.17** 0.12 
(0.068) (0.11) (0.087) (0.16) (0.13) (0.085) (0.14) (0.11) (0.079) (0.14) 
  
Hours worked 
per week 0.049** 0.077** 0.025 0.012 -0.013 0.065*** 0.046 0.055* 0.051** 0.037 
(0.020) (0.037) (0.023) (0.047) (0.038) (0.024) (0.041) (0.028) (0.024) (0.039) 
  
Number of 
obs. 16,535 8,182 8,353 3,686 5,080 7,769 3,957 10,085 10,626 5,909 
Note: hours worked per week is in unit 10. 
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CHAPTER II: DO WALMART SUPERCENTERS IMPROVE FOOD SECURITY?22 
1. Introduction 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)’s Food and Nutrition Service 
seeks to eliminate child hunger by 2015. At the same time, certain municipalities (like Los 
Angeles, Chicago, and New York City) are working to prevent big box retailers like Walmart 
from opening within the city limits, while some states and municipalities have passed laws, 
taxes, and mandates targeting Walmart specifically and seeking to make it harder for them to do 
business (Hicks 2007: 267-293). This is in spite of research showing that entry by Walmart 
Supercenters leads to lower food prices, particularly for low-income consumers (Basker and 
Noel, 2009). Are these new barriers to entry at odds with the Food and Nutrition Service’s goal 
of eliminating child hunger? How should the Food and Nutrition Service advise governments 
that are making local development policy? We add to existing research on food security by 
exploring the relationship between the diffusion of new retail technologies—specifically, the 
Walmart Supercenter mass merchandiser format—and various outcomes indicative of food 
insecurity. 
Addressing food security is an important part of a broad anti-poverty strategy. Existing 
research shows that higher food prices increase food insecurity (Gregory and Coleman-Jensen, 
2011) and that families with more workers in “nonstandard” sectors tend to be less food secure 
(Coleman-Jensen, 2011). Some programs (like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) 
have improved food security (Gunderson et al., 2011). We expand on the existing literature by 
examining how a broad structural change in the American retail sector affects food security. 
																																																								
22	This research was conducted using restricted data of the Current Population Survey at the Atlanta Research Data 
Center (ARDC). The views expressed in this paper do not reflect those of the Bureau of Census, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, or the ARDC. Any errors are mine.	
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Carden (2012) surveys the history of American retail and discusses “the rise of mass-
market merchandisers” like Walmart and Costco. In 1988, Walmart expanded into large-scale 
food retail when it opened its first Walmart Supercenter. Today, Walmart is the country’s largest 
grocer. Walmart Supercenters are by far the dominant supercenter chain, with 2907 locations in 
2011 compared to 251 Super Targets and 26 Super K-marts.23 Courtemanche and Carden (2011) 
find that Walmart Supercenters increase obesity, but they did not examine the other side of the 
coin: Walmart’s “everyday low prices” could also reduce hunger and improve nourishment. We 
aim to fill this void. 
There are a number of mechanisms by which Walmart Supercenters might affect food 
security. The first (and most obvious) was identified by Basker and Noel (2009). Walmart 
Supercenters offer low prices, but they also exert pressure on existing food retailers to lower 
their prices. Indeed, Basker and Noel (2009) find that the largest price reductions after Walmart 
Supercenter entry come at stores that serve primarily low-income consumers. Hausman and 
Leibtag (2009) and Furman (2005) argue that the consumer benefits from diffusion of mass-
market merchandisers are considerable and progressively distributed: the major beneficiaries of 
these firms’ lower prices are low-income consumers who spend large percentages of their 
incomes on food. It is possible that, in light of these lower prices and progressively-distributed 
benefits, entry by Walmart Supercenters improves food security.  
There are also other mechanisms by which Walmart Supercenters could conceivably 
affect food security. First, they add to the local food supply, and Walmart often opens stores in 
rural “food deserts” that lack sufficient options for fresh produce. Second, these stores could 
impact food security through their effects on employment and wages, which could work in either 
direction and are the subject of debate in the literature (Basker, 2005; Neumark et al., 2008; 
																																																								
23 These numbers come from the three companies’ 2011 annual reports. 
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Dube and Jacobs, 2004; Dube et al., 2007). Moreover, Coleman-Jensen (2011) argues that 
“nonstandard” work is associated with greater food insecurity, and big box chains’ effect on the 
share of “nonstandard” versus “standard” work is also ambiguous. Pope and Pope (2012) claim 
that Walmart entry raises real estate values, and Guo (2011) argue s that more home assets are 
associated with more food security.  
We estimate the impacts of Walmart Supercenters on food security using data from the 
2001-2007 waves of the December Current Population Study Food Security Supplement (CPS-
FSS) matched with primary data on Walmart Supercenter locations. Our outcomes are counts of 
the number of affirmative responses on the household and child-specific portions of the food 
insecurity questionnaire, along with binary variables for household food insecurity, household 
very low food security, child food insecurity, and child very low food security. Naïve regressions 
that control for demographics and year fixed effects produce negative associations between 
distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter and several of the food insecurity measures, 
suggesting that closer proximity to a Walmart Supercenter actually worsens food insecurity. 
Since these associations may reflect underlying differences in population characteristics rather 
than causal effects of the stores, we then turn to an instrumental variables (IV) analysis that 
utilizes the predictable geographic expansion patterns of Walmart Supercenters outward from 
corporate headquarters. Specifically, we instrument for Walmart Supercenters with the 
interaction of distance from Bentonville, Arkansas (Walmart’s headquarters) and year. The IV 
results show that a greater distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter significantly increases 
food insecurity according to all three household measures as well as two of the three child 
measures. In other words, after accounting for the endogeneity of Walmart location decisions, 
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closer proximity to a Walmart Supercenter improves food security. Subsample analyses reveal 
that the effect is especially large for low-income households. 
2. Methods 
We begin by estimating linear probability models (LPMs) of the form 
௜ܻ௖௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵln	ሺܦܫܵ_ܹܵ௖௧ሻ ൅෍ߛ௝ ௝ܺ௜௖௧
௃
௝ୀଵ
൅෍߬௬ܻܴ௬
௒
௬ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜௖௧																							ሺ1ሻ			 
where ௜ܻ௖௧ is the outcome (each of the aforementioned food insecurity variables) for 
household i living in census tract c in year t, ܦܫܵ_ܹܵ௖௧ is distance in miles from census tract c to 
the nearest Walmart Supercenter in year t, ௝ܺ௜௖௧ is a set of J control variables, ܻܴ௬ is a set of Y 
year fixed effects (ܻܴ௬ ൌ 1 if ݕ ൌ ݐሻ, ߝ௜௖௧ is the error term, and the other Greek letters are 
parameters to be estimated.24 Distance from a census tract to the nearest Walmart Supercenter 
indicates to what extent residents are exposed to Walmart Supercenters, and therefore ߚଵ 
measures the effect of Walmart Supercenters on households’ food insecurity. We take the natural 
logarithm of distance since it seems reasonable to expect a diminishing marginal effect. For 
instance, if a new Walmart Supercenter reduces a household’s distance to the nearest Walmart 
Supercenter from 50 to 40 miles, this is unlikely to matter since both stores are prohibitively far 
away. The conclusions reached, however, are the same if we use a linear specification. Standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by census tract, since census tract is the 
geographic level at which we measure Walmart Supercenter exposure. 
A concern with equation (1) is the possible endogeneity of Supercenter locations. 
Omitted variable bias could result if changes over time in unobserved area characteristics 
																																																								
24 In unreported regressions (available upon request), we have verified that the estimated marginal effects are 
virtually identical using probit and logit models instead of linear probability models. This is not surprising since 
LPMs have been shown to give reliable estimates of average effects (e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2008, Section 3.4.2). 
We prefer to focus on the LPM estimates since they are easier to implement in the subsequent instrumental variables 
regressions. 
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influence both the entry of Walmart Supercenters and residents’ levels of food security. We are 
able to control for some obvious confounders such as income, but it is difficult to account for all 
of them. Reverse causality is also a concern, as big box grocers may specifically target areas 
lacking sufficient food supply. 
We attempt to overcome these endogeneity concerns by using instrumental variables, or 
variables that are strongly correlated with the endogenous store variables but otherwise 
uncorrelated with the outcome (food insecurity) variables conditional on the controls. We adopt a 
similar strategy used by Courtemanche and Carden (2011) to investigate the impact of Walmart 
Supercenters on obesity. This strategy is based on the observation that the pattern of Walmart 
Supercenter expansion starting in 1988 was to radiate outward from Walmart’s headquarters in 
Bentonville, AR, gradually reaching the entire continental United States by the late 2000s.25 The 
expansionary pattern indicates that in the first few years, areas close to northwest Arkansas were 
the most likely to experience Walmart Supercenter entry, then in the next few years areas slightly 
further away were the most likely to have new Walmart Supercenters. The process continues 
until in the later year states on the coasts were the most likely to be exposed to the entry of 
Walmart Supercenters. In other words, during our sample period distance from Bentonville 
influenced the probability an area experienced Walmart Supercenter entry in a given year, and 
this effect changed over time. The interaction of distance from Bentonville with time therefore 
serves as a plausibly exogenous instrument that can identify the causal impact of Walmart 
Supercenters on food security.26  
																																																								
25 See Courtemanche and Carden (2011) for maps of Supercenters’ expansion over time. 
26 This distance-from-Bentonville identification strategy has also been used by Neumark et al. (2008) and Dube et al. 
(2007) in studies of Walmart’s effect on local labor markets. Basker (2006) critiqued the use of this strategy in the 
labor market context, but Courtemanche and Carden (2011) conduct a wide array of robustness checks and placebo 
tests to verify that Basker’s criticism did not apply to health-related contexts such as obesity. 
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Specifically, we divide the U.S. into 17 distance rings reflecting 100-mile increments of 
distance from Bentonville (e.g. less than 100 miles, 100-200 miles, …, 1600 or more miles) and 
create an indicator variable for each ring.27 The distance ring dummies are included as controls, 
while the interactions of the distance ring dummies with year are used as instruments. The 
resulting two-stage IV model therefore has the first-stage equation 
ln	ሺܦܫܵ_ܹܵ௖௧ሻ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅෍ߠ௝ ௝ܺ௜௖௧
௃
௝ୀଵ
൅෍ߩ௬ܻܴ௬
௒
௬ୀଵ
൅෍߮ௗܦܫܵ_ܤܧ ௗܰ
஽
ௗୀଵ
൅ 
෍෍߮ௗ௬൫ܦܫܵ_ܤܧ ௗܰ ∗ ܻܴ௬൯
௒
௬ୀଵ
஽
ௗୀଵ
൅ ߤ௜௖௧		ሺ2ሻ 
where ܦܫܵ_ܤܧ ௗܰ is the distance from census tract c to Bentonville while ߤ௜௖௧ is the error 
term. The second-stage regression is    
௜ܻ௖௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵln	ሺܦܫܵ_ܹܵ௖௧ሻ෣ ൅෍ߛ௝ ௝ܺ௜௖௧
௃
௝ୀଵ
൅෍߬௬ܻܴ௬
௒
௬ୀଵ
൅෍ߙௗܦܫܵ_ܤܧ ௗܰ
஽
ௗୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜௖௧					ሺ3ሻ 
which differs from the naïve regression (1) by replacing the distance to Walmart 
Supercenters with the predicted values of this variable estimated in equation (2) and adding the 
distance ring fixed effects as controls.  
Identification of ߚଵ in the IV model comes from the assumption that the distance*year 
interactions can be excluded from the second-state regression (3) – i.e. that these interactions are 
uncorrelated with changes over time in food security conditional on the controls. By including 
the distance ring fixed effects in (3), we allow for the distances to be correlated with levels of 
food security; we only need to assume that they are uncorrelated with trends. We test the validity 
																																																								
27 The 100-mile distance ring classification follows Neumark et al. (2008) and Dube et al. (2007). In unreported 
specifications we found that the results are robust to the use of various other specifications for distance (e.g. linear, 
quadratic) and year (e.g. dummies for each year).  
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of the identifying assumption by checking the robustness of the results to the inclusion of the 
various combinations of control variables and performing the over-identification test.  
3. Data 
Our source of individual-level data on food security is the Current Population Survey 
Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS), an annual household survey conducted by the U.S. 
Census Bureau for the USDA. The CPS-FSS is the December supplement to the monthly Current 
Population Survey (CPS), which is a nationally representative survey on labor force statistics. 
The participants of the CPS-FSS are the same as those interviewed by the original monthly CPS. 
In the month when the CPS-FSS is conducted, the participants answer the labor force questions 
as well as a series of questions concerning food security, food consumption, and the usage of 
food assistance programs. We currently focus on the CPS-FSS from 2001-2007 because we can 
match the CPS data with our data on Walmart Supercenters until 2007. However, we expect to 
extend the research period in the future since we are still in the process of collecting reliable data 
on Walmart Supercenter openings after 2007.  
The CPS-FSS includes the standard set of 18 questions that are used to assess household 
and child food security. These questions ask whether in the last 12 months: 1) the statement “We 
worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more” was often or 
sometimes true; 2) the statement “The food that we bought didn’t last and we didn’t have money 
to get more” was often or sometimes true; 3) the statement “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced 
meals” was often or sometimes true; 4) you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of 
meals or skipped meals because there wasn’t enough money for food; 5) #4 happened in more 
than two months; 6) you ever ate less than you felt you should because there wasn’t enough 
money for food; 7) you were ever hungry but didn’t eat because you couldn’t afford food; 8) you 
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lost weight because you didn’t have enough money for food; 9) you or other adults in your 
household ever did not eat for a whole day because there wasn’t enough money for food; 10) #9 
happened in more than two months; 11) the statement “We relied on only a few kinds of low-
cost food to feed our children because we were running out of money to buy food” was 
sometimes or often true; 12) the statement “We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal, 
because we couldn’t afford that” was sometimes or often true; 13) the statement “The children 
were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough food” was sometimes or often 
true; 14) you ever cut the size of any of the children’s meals because there wasn’t enough money 
for food; 15) the children were ever hungry but you just couldn’t afford more food; 16) any of 
the children ever skipped a meal because there wasn’t enough money for food; 17) #16 happened 
in more than two months; and 18) any of the children ever did not eat for a whole day because 
there wasn’t enough money for food. Following convention (e.g. Nord et al., 2005), we use six 
outcome variables to measure food insecurity. Two of them are continuous variables indicating 
the counts of affirmative responses to the above questions for household and children separately. 
Another four are dummy variables summarizing the answers to these 18 questions: “household 
food insecurity” (three or more “yes” answers), “household very low food security” (eight or 
more “yes” answers or six or more in households without children), “child food insecurity” (two 
or more “yes” answers on child questions), and “child very low food security” (five or more 
“yes” answers on child questions).   
We also use the CPS-FSS to construct three sets of individual-level control variables: 
demographic characteristics, economic characteristics, and participation in government food 
assistance programs. The demographic variables include adult responder’s age; number of own 
children (dummies for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5+, with 0 as the omitted base category); dummies for 
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whether race/ethnicity is non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, or Hispanic (other 
race/ethnicity is the omitted category); dummies for married and formerly married (never 
married is the omitted category); and dummies for high school degree but no further, some 
college, college degree, and graduate degree (less than high school degree is the omitted 
category). The economic variables are household income (dummies for the 16 categories given 
by the CPS), occupation (dummies for 17 categories), and median income in the census tract.28 
The food assistance variables are indicators for whether any household member received 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits; Women, Infants, and Children 
(WIC) benefits; and free/reduced-price school breakfasts or lunches in the past year. 
We also include county-level food availability variables as control variables in some 
regressions. These include numbers of restaurants, grocery stores/supermarkets, convenience 
stores, and supercenters/warehouse clubs (subtracting out Walmart Supercenters), obtained from 
the United States Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns. We scale these variables by 
population (per 100,000 capita) using annual population estimates from the Census Bureau. 
Our independent variable of interest is distance from each respondent’s census tract of 
residence to the nearest Walmart Supercenter as of the end of each year. Walmart Supercenter 
entry dates and locations through 2007 were hand-collected and used in Courtemanche and 
Carden (2011, 2014). The census tract geographic data come from the U.S. Census Bureau 
Tiger/Line Shapefiles 2000. For each census tract, an internal point, usually a geographic center 
of the area, is identified, and its latitude and longitude coordinates are used to label the census 
tract. The distance from a census tract to the nearest Walmart Supercenter is then computed 
using the geodetic distance between the two sets of corresponding coordinates. The geodetic 
																																																								
28 About 15% of the sample has missing income data. We drop these individuals for the reported regressions, but the 
results are very similar if we include them and indicate them with a dummy variable. 
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distance measures the length of the shortest arc between two points on the ellipsoid surface of the 
earth. The distance from a census tract to the headquarters of Walmart at Bentonville, AR, is 
calculated following the same algorithm, then categorized into 17 distance rings. 
Merging the CPS-FSS to the census tract-level geographic data and county-level store 
variables requires precise geographic identifiers that are not available in the public-use data. We 
therefore use the restricted version of the CPS-FSS, provided by the Census Bureau after an 
application process and accessed in the Atlanta Census Research Data Center.  
Dropping observations with missing data yields a final analysis sample of approximately 
236,000 households, 75,000 of which have children. Following Research Data Center disclosure 
policies, we are only able to report sample sizes rounded to the nearest 1,000 observations. Table 
8 presents the summary statistics for the food security and Walmart variables, both for the full 
sample and subsamples that we will consider in our regression analyses: low income households 
(<$25,000), households living in MSA central cities, and households living in rural areas.  
In the full sample, on average, households affirmatively answer 0.7 questions for the 18-
item food security module. There are 11 percent of households have experienced food insecurity, 
and 2 percent of them have very low food security. Turning to child food insecurity, the situation 
is a bit better. On average, children affirmatively answer 0.46 questions of the 18-items. Among 
all children, 6 percent of them have food insecurity, and only 0.5 percent of them have very low 
food security.  
Low income households and children from low income families experience much worse 
food insecurity. They affirmatively answer twice as many questions as those in the full sample. 
The percentage of food insecurity and very low food security for both households and children 
roughly doubled in the low income households sample compared to the full sample. Dividing the 
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sample by MSA central cities and rural areas, the food insecurity measures are similar to those of 
the full sample.  
4. Results 
Tables 9-10 report the results for food insecurity outcomes for households as a whole and 
for children separately. The first column is for the linear probability model without instruments. 
The last five columns are for the full-sample IV regressions, with distance ring from 
Bentonville*year as the instruments for distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter. The five 
IV columns report from specifications with: 1) only demographic controls, 2) demographic and 
economic controls, 3) demographic and food assistance controls, 4) demographic and food 
availability controls (warehouse clubs, restaurants, grocery stores/supermarkets, and convenience 
stores), and 5) all sets of controls. We experiment with different combinations of control 
variables because it is not clear whether it is appropriate to control for the economic, food 
assistance, and food availability variables. On one hand, they might help capture unobservable 
determinants of both Walmart entry decisions and food insecurity. On the other hand, they could 
potentially be endogenous to Walmart presence: Walmart entry could influence local incomes 
(which in turn affect eligibility for food assistance programs) as well as other food retailers’ 
entry and exit decisions. It is therefore important to verify that including these sets of variables 
does not meaningfully impact the results.  
Table 9 presents the results for household food insecurity. Estimates from the LPM 
model demonstrate a significant and negative association between Walmart Supercenters and all 
three household food insecurity measures. However, the LPM estimates are unlikely to reflect a 
causal effect because of the aforementioned endogeneity problems. We therefore turn to the IV 
models. All IV estimates are positive and significant, indicating that the causal effect of having a 
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Walmart Supercenter nearby is to reduce the likelihood of being food insecure. Since we use the 
natural log of the distance from the nearest Supercenter variable, the coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted as the approximate effect of a 100% increase in distance. The IV results therefore 
suggest that 100% greater distance from Walmart leads to 0.06-0.08 more affirmative responses 
to the household portion of the food insecurity questionnaire, while increasing the rate of 
household food insecurity by 0.99-1.2 percentage points and the rate of household very low food 
security by 0.52-0.67 percentage points. In Table 9, we also present the first-stage F tests and the 
over-identification test p-values as evidence for the validity of the instrument. In all 
specifications, the first-stage F statistics are always safely over the rule-of-thumb critical value of 
10, which is the conventionally accepted levels for instruments to be considered sufficiently 
strong. Moreover, the over-identification tests are insignificant in most specifications, which 
suggests that the instruments are appropriate.  
The results for child food insecurity, shown in Table 10, are generally similar to those for 
household food insecurity. We find negative, though insignificant, correlations between the three 
child food insecurity outcomes and distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter. The IV 
estimates are positive and significant for count of affirmative child responses and child food 
insecurity, indicating that a shorter distance to Walmart Supercenters reduces the likelihood of 
children being food insecure. A 100% increase in distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter 
increases the number of affirmative responses to the child portion of the food insecurity 
questionnaire by 0.028-0.033 and the probability of a household’s children being food insecure 
of 1.3-1.4 percentage points. However, the IV estimates are small and insignificant for the third 
child outcome: child very low food security. We suspect that this is because child very low food 
security is an extreme condition that applies to a very small portion of our sample (under 1%). 
	 42
For all outcomes, the results are robust if we add the economic, food assistance programs, and 
county food availability controls. The first-stage F statistics are again larger than 10 and the 
over-identification tests are insignificant in most specifications, both indicating that the 
instrument performs well. 
Table 11 reports for subsamples for which we hypothesize the effects of Walmart on food 
security might be particularly strong: low-income households (<$25,000), households living in 
MSA central cities, and households living in rural areas. Low income households might be 
particularly sensitive to the reduction in food prices brought about by Walmart entry. Walmart 
Supercenters are also likely to improve food security in areas with relatively little food 
availability, as households in these areas experience large reductions in the time cost of obtaining 
food. In this version of the paper, we proxy for low food availability areas by examining 
subsamples of MSA central cities and rural areas, the two types of locations most commonly 
alleged to be food deserts. The first column of Table 11 simply reprints the estimates from the 
full sample IV regressions for comparison purposes. By restricting the sample to low income 
households, we again find positive and significant effects of Walmart Supercenters, and the 
effects are substantially larger than those from the full sample. The results for the subsamples of 
households in MSA central cities and rural areas are mixed. The estimates are larger than those 
from the full sample in some specifications while smaller in others, and they are fairly imprecise. 
In future versions of the paper, we will attempt to improve on this portion of the analysis by 
identifying the exact census tracts designated as food deserts by the USDA and running 
subsample regressions for households in these areas. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper asks whether Walmart Supercenters, which lower food prices and expand food 
availability, improve food security. We estimate instrumental variables (IV) models that exploit 
the predictable geographic expansion patterns of Walmart Supercenters outward from corporate 
headquarter. Our results rely on data from the restricted-access 2001-2007 waves of the 
December CPS Food Security Supplement. These data allow us to investigate the impact of 
Walmart Supercenters on households’ and children’s food insecurity at the census tract-level. 
We find that the entry of Walmart Supercenters helps to alleviate food insecurity for both 
households and children. The results are robust to the inclusion of controls for households’ 
economic status, food assistance program participation, and county food availability. 
Our finding contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, we provide new evidence 
on the causes of food insecurity. Considerable resources are allocated through food assistance 
programs toward protecting households, especially children, from food insecurity. However, no 
research to date has examined the influence of big box grocers on food insecurity. Second, we 
contribute to the debate about Walmart’s health effects. Big box grocers, Walmart Supercenters 
in particular, are blamed for causing obesity (Courtemanche and Carden, 2011; Courtemanche et 
al., 2015). However, we are the first to study the other side of the coin: how the same cheap and 
readily available food that drives big box grocers’ effect on obesity may also help in fighting 
food insecurity. This improvement in food security adds another factor local governments should 
consider when deciding whether to use policy levers (e.g. taxes, zoning laws) to either 
incentivize or prevent entry from bog box stores.  
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6. Tables 
Table 8 Summary Statistics for Key Variables  
  
Full 
sample 
Low-income 
households 
MSA central 
cities 
Rural 
areas 
Count of affirmative household responses 0.71 1.65 0.7 0.74 
(1.93) (2.77) (1.94) (1.93) 
Household food insecurity 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.11 
(0.31) (0.43) (0.31) (0.31) 
Household very low food security 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 
(0.15) (0.23) (0.15) (0.15) 
Count of affirmative child responses 0.46 0.88 0.45 0.48 
(0.81) (0.19) (0.82) 0.78 
Child food insecurity 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.06 
(0.24) (0.36) (0.24) (0.24) 
Child very low food security 0.005 0.01 0.005 0.004 
  (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) 
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Table 9 Regression Results for Household Food Insecurity Outcomes 
 LPM 
(1) 
Instrumental Variables 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Count of Affirmative Household Responses      
       ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter) -0.027*** 0.073*** 0.07*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.065*** 
 (0.005) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.0022) 
       First Stage F Statistic -- 133 134 133 130 130 
       Over-identification Test P-Value    -- 0.13 0.47 0.094 0.11 0.27 
Household Food Insecurity       
       ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter) -0.004*** 0.012*** 0.011**** 0.0099*** 0.012*** 0.01*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.004) (0.0036) 
       First Stage F Statistic -- 133 134 133 130 130 
       Over-identification Test P-Value    -- 0.22 0.59 0.27 0.19 0.55 
Household Very Low Food Security       
       ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter) -00018*** 0.0059*** 0.0054** 0.0052** 0.0067*** 0.0055** 
 (0.0005) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022) 
       First Stage F Statistic -- 133 134 133 130 130 
       Over-identification Test P-Value    -- 0.22 0.43 0.17 0.22 0.35 
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Economic Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Food Assistance Controls NO NO NO YES NO YES 
County Food Availability Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Distance Ring Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by census tract, are in parentheses.  *** indicates statistically significant at 1% 
level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.  CPS household sampling weights are used. Sample size is approximately 236,000. 
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Table 10 Regression Results for Child Food Insecurity Outcomes 
 LPM 
(1) 
Instrumental Variables 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Count of Affirmative Child Responses      
       ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter) -0.007** 0.033** 0.032** 0.03** 0.033** 0.028* 
 (0.0034) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
       First Stage F Statistic -- 100 101 100 94 95 
       Overidentification Test P-Value    -- 0.018 0.072 0.063 0.017 0.098 
Child Food Insecurity       
       ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter) -0.0012 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0052) (0.005) (0.005) (0.0052) (0.005) 
       First Stage F Statistic -- 100 101 100 94 95 
       Overidentification Test P-Value    -- 0.034 0.081 0.095 0.031 0.11 
Child Very Low Food Security       
       ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter) -0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
       First Stage F Statistic -- 100 101 100 94 95 
       Overidentification Test P-Value    -- 0.81 0.87 0.81 0.82 0.85 
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Economic Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Food Assistance Controls NO NO NO YES NO YES 
County Food Availability Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Distance Ring Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by census tract, are in parentheses.  *** indicates statistically significant at 1% 
level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.  CPS household sampling weights are used. Sample size is approximately 75,000. 
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Table 11 Subsample Regression Results 
 Full Sample Subsamples of Interest 
 Income < $25,000 MSA Central City Rural Area 
Count of Affirmative Household Responses     
       ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter) 0.07*** 0.17*** 0.051 0.07 
 (0.023) (0.06) (0.042) (0.063) 
Household Food Insecurity     
       ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter) 0.011**** 0.03*** 0.011* 0.0058 
 (0.0037) (0.0093) (0.0067) (0.0097) 
Household Very Low Food Security     
       ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter) 0.0054** 0.014** 0.0055 0.012* 
 (0.0022) (0.0064) (0.0043) (0.0066) 
       Number of Observations 236,000 70,000 68,000 61,000 
Count of Affirmative Child Responses     
       ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter) 0.032** 0.063 0.01 0.034 
 (0.015) (0.045) (0.029) (0.046) 
Child Food Insecurity     
       ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter) 0.014*** 0.027* 0.0032 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.0098) (0.015) 
Child Very Low Food Security     
       ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter) 0.0004 0.0001 0.001 0.0048 
 (0.0014) (0.0046) (0.0028) (0.0042) 
       Number of Observations 75,000 17,000 20,000 19,000 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by census tract, are in parentheses.  *** indicates statistically significant at 1% 
level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.  CPS household sampling weights are used. All regressions include demographic and economic controls and 
distance ring and year fixed effect
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CHAPTER III: EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL 
LEAVE ACT USING LABOR MARKET FLOWS 
1. Introduction 
Workplace-mandated maternity benefits are essential to support working mothers in order 
to maintain a continuous labor supply. In the U.S., the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is 
such a federal policy mandating the provision of maternity leave to covered employees. The 
FMLA was legislated in February 1993 and went into effect in August 1993. Under the FMLA, 
eligible employees in establishments with 50 or more employees are entitled to take up to twelve 
weeks of unpaid yet job-protected leaves for health related issues, and, most importantly, for the 
birth and care of newborns.29 
Despite the fact that FMLA leaves are unpaid and subject to a rigorous application 
process,30 they have been broadly used since its legislation. According to the 2000 FMLA survey 
report,31 16.5% of all employees in the U.S., 23.8 million, had taken FMLA leaves in the 18 
months prior to the survey. Both male and female workers are entitled to FMLA leaves. Among 
eligible leave-takers, 57.7% were women and 42.3% were men. However, females (75.8%) with 
children under age 18 were significantly more likely than males with young children (45.1%) to 
take leaves. In addition, 42.8% of female leave-takers took maternity disability, for which only 
female employees are eligible. Maternity leave was also the longest among all the types of leaves. 
While most leaves were short-term (83.3% of leaves lasted less than ten days), 68.4% of 
maternity leaves lasted for more than 30 days.    
																																																								
29 Detailed benefits are provided on this website: http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/ 
30 To apply for FMLA leaves, an employee has to fulfill these requirements (not exhaustive): The employee has 
worked for the employer for at least one year and 1,250 hours or more; the employer is an establishment with 50 or 
more employees within a geographic radius of 75 miles; and the employee has to inform the employer at least 30 
days in advance.  
31 The full report is available on this website: http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/toc.htm 
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Proponents of maternity leave legislation believe that the FMLA could “promote the goal 
of equal employment opportunity for women and men” (The Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993: Public Law 103-3, 107 Stat. 6-7). However, like any policy designed to ease work-family 
conflicts, the FMLA might have unexpected effects. Economic analyses indicate that the costs of 
providing maternity leave will be largely borne by those who most value the benefits (Summers, 
1989). In the case of the FMLA, the principal “costs” are disruption costs to employers due to 
worker leaves. Leave taking disturbs production routine, requires temporary replacement hiring, 
and adds uncertainty since there might be a chance that leave-takers won’t return. These costs 
shift downward the labor demand curve for young women as they are most likely to benefit 
directly from maternity leave. Because labor supply is generally more inelastic than labor 
demand, the costs of the mandate are likely to be shifted to women of childbearing age, either in 
the form of lower wages or as a reduction in employment if wages are rigid.   
In this paper, I take the legislation of the FMLA as a natural experiment and examine its 
impact on young women’s labor market outcomes. The identification of the treatment effect is 
three-fold. The first source of variation comes from the difference between the pre- and the post- 
FMLA periods. The second source lies in the fact that some states passed state-level maternity 
leave mandates before 1993, while others did not. Therefore, the FMLA should have a greater 
impact on states without a prior maternity leave policy than on states with a mandate in place 
before the federal FMLA. The third source of variation arises because women of childbearing 
age differ from other workers in that they are eligible for maternity leave. Employees can take 
FMLA leaves due to various types of health-related reasons. While other types of leaves are 
extended to all workers, maternity leave is a group-specific benefit that applies only to women. 
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Therefore, I expect that the FMLA would have larger effect on women of childbearing age. 
These variations enable me to adopt a triple-difference (DDD) method. 
The novel feature of this study is that I use six labor market outcomes, including 
employment and wages, new hires and starting salaries, as well as job separations and recalls. 
Previous studies on this topic focus predominantly on how the policy change affects employment 
and wages. However, such stock variables consist mostly of existing workers, and thus, are 
unlikely to adjust instantly at the time that the FMLA was legislated. It takes time for the labor 
market to develop a new equilibrium level. I seek to improve upon the literature by using flow 
variables, i.e., hiring, separations and recalls. Firms’ hiring decisions are more flexible, and thus 
might change instantly when the FMLA was enacted. Separations evaluate how the FMLA 
influences work tenure. Recalls were once widespread in the U.S., particularly in the industrial 
and unionized sectors of the economy, with 70% of workers temporarily laid off being rehired by 
their former employers (Katz and Meyer, 1990). Temporary layoffs and recalls are far less likely 
today. That said, temporary leaves of absence, common among child-bearing women, and other 
labor market flows reflect the dynamics of the labor market, and therefore may help one 
understands the immediate causal effects of the FMLA. 
To conduct the analysis, I use data from a relatively new data set, the Quarterly 
Workforce Indicators (QWI). This publicly accessible data set contains rich information on labor 
force measurements, including the six labor market outcomes. It also has almost universal 
coverage on employment in the private sector. Using the QWI data and applying the triple-
difference method, I obtain little evidence that the FMLA reduces the starting salaries offered to 
young women and increases recalls among them when using older women as the comparison 
group. When compared with young men, the FMLA has no significant effect on any labor 
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market outcomes. However, I am unable to determine whether the lack of evidence indicates a 
true zero effect or if it is due to imprecise estimation and relatively uninformative data. 
2. Previous Literature 
The FMLA is the first federal mandate in the U.S. that requires the provision of  
maternity leave benefits among covered establishments. Since its legislation, the FMLA has 
generated a far-reaching effect on society. Both male and female employees take advantage of 
the policy, while working mothers are more likely to take leaves or take longer leaves than 
working fathers (Berger and Waldfogel, 2004; Han, Ruhm, and Waldfogel, 2009; Han and 
Waldfogel, 2003). Research exploring the consequences of the FMLA generally find that it 
encourages the fertility rate among working women (Averett and Whittington, 2001; Rossin, 
2011); promotes breastfeeding (Berger, Hill and Waldfogel, 2005); improves infants’ health 
(Rossin, 2011); and enhances new mothers’ mental and physical health (Chatterji and 
Markowitz, 2012; Chatterji et al., 2013). 
Several studies have examined the effects of the FMLA on employment and wages, but 
they have reached no consensus. Waldfogel (1999) uses the variations generated from the 
passing points of state maternity leave laws and the federal FMLA as a natural experiment to 
estimate the effects of the FMLA. Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), she 
finds that the FMLA has no significant impact on women’s employment or wages. Using data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79), Baum (2003) 
improves the estimation by identifying whether women work for establishments that are large 
enough to fulfill the FMLA’s coverage requirements. He also finds insignificant effects of the 
FMLA on both employment and wages. 
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Another study by Espinola-Arredondo and Mondal (2009) examines the impact of the 
FMLA while taking into account a related policy--Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI). They 
compare the effect of the FMLA in states with TDI and those without. Their findings suggest 
that the FMLA significantly increases female employment. Observing the declining labor force 
participation rate among mothers with infants, Goodpaster (2010) analyzes whether the FMLA 
has an impact on women’s labor force participation. She finds that almost two-thirds of the 
reduction in labor force participation among new mothers in the mid-1990s can be explained by 
the legislation of the FMLA. To examine the gender-wage gap, Manchester et al. (2008) use the 
FMLA as a policy shock to work commitment. They find a negative impact of maternity leave 
usage on women’s wages, which suggests that firms either discriminate or have expectations of 
lower job commitment and productivity for young women. Thomas (2014) suggests that women 
are more likely to remain employed after the legislation of the FMLA, but at the same time, they 
are also less likely to be promoted.  
Previous studies provide little knowledge on the effects of workplace mandates, mainly 
because we generally do not have much information to measure the effects in a precise way. 
Almost all of the literature of the FMLA focuses on how the policy change affects women’s 
employment and wages. This study is innovative in the sense that I explore the immediate 
impacts of the FMLA on labor market flows, including hires and starting salaries, as well as 
separations and recalls. While it takes time for employment and wages to adjust to a new 
equilibrium level, firms have flexible control on hiring decisions. Intuitively, if firms believe that 
the FMLA imposes a cost of hiring young women, they may adjust hiring decisions accordingly. 
On the other hand, if such family benefit attracts young women to join the labor force, the firms 
may be more likely to hire young women as the pool of candidates is larger. Job separations may 
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also be affected by the FMLA. Now that employees have the option to take leaves when 
necessary, the policy may enhance job commitment among young women. Yet, firms might be 
more likely to lay off potential leave-takers. The last outcome, recalls, refers to rehired workers 
who are temporarily laid off or on a lengthy leave by the same employer. The FMLA might 
affect recalls if choices by the firm or the employee result in lengthy leave-taking (consecutive 
quarters off the payroll in the QWI), followed by a return to work (returning to an 
establishment’s payroll), defined as a recall in the QWI.  
The QWI not only provides the labor measures needed for this investigation, but also 
empowers the generalizability of study results since it has universal coverage of private 
establishments. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that utilizes labor market flow 
measurements to identify the causal effects of the FMLA on women’s labor market outcomes.32 I 
consider the analysis in this paper a complement to the existing studies. In addition, the hires and 
separations measurements can be applied to broad research questions concerning the effects of 
policies that change labor demand and supply. 
3. Data 
I use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators to estimate the effects of the FMLA on young 
women’s labor market outcomes. QWI is a publicly available dataset that contains rich 
information, collected quarterly, on labor force measures at local levels. This data set is based on 
a wide variety of employment records, such as unemployment insurance data, social security 
data, federal tax records, etc. From these data sources, individual-level data are linked to firm 
information, then further aggregated based on locations, quarters, and demographic categories.  
Within each geographic location, the data are divided into 16 data cells corresponding to 16 sex-
																																																								
32 Curtis et al. (2014) use the QWI to examine the effects of California’s 2004 paid family leave policy on new hire 
earnings, employment, separations, and recalls. 
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age groups.33 Therefore, the level of observation is at the sex and age group-county-quarter level. 
For example, a single data cell may represent an employment measurement for workers who are 
females aged 25-34 and employed in establishments in a particular county in certain quarter of 
the year. 
There are at least three advantages of using QWI data to investigate the current research 
question. First, QWI data have almost universal coverage on employment statewide. The data 
cover 98% of all private sector employment in non-agricultural industries. Second, QWI contains 
various labor supply measurements, including labor market flows that are at the heart of this 
study. Last but not least, although QWI data are aggregated, they are detailed enough to let me 
identify the demographic groups that might be affected most by the FMLA, i.e., women of 
childbearing age. Hence, I can determine the causal effects of the FMLA by comparing labor 
market outcomes between young women and other workers. 
Two limitations of the QWI are that it fails to measure either employer size or hours of 
work. Because the FMLA covers only those employees with least one year of job tenure and 
work in establishments with 50+ employees (roughly 58 percent of all employees), estimates of 
FMLA effects from the QWI are likely to be seriously attenuated. Although the QWI measures 
quarterly earnings, the inability to measure hours makes it difficult to distinguish differences in 
wages from differences in hours worked. 
An additional shortcoming of the data available in the QWI is that it relies on the 
voluntary participation of individual states, and only six states reported information in QWI in 
the early 1990s. They are California (CA), Idaho (ID), Maryland (MD), Oregon (OR), 
Washington (WA), and Wisconsin (WI). Despite this limitation, the six states still provide a fair 
amount of variations because they differ in terms of the passing dates of maternity leave benefits. 
																																																								
33 By each gender, there are eight age groups: 14-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65-99 years old. 
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Table 12 presents the legislation dates for each of the six states. Among them, four states, CA, 
OR, WA and WI, had state-level mandated maternity leave before 1993. The remaining two, ID 
and MD, had no such policy prior to the legislation of the federal FMLA. Therefore, we would 
expect that when the FMLA was enacted in 1993, the former four states would have been 
impacted less than the latter two. For convenience, we refer to the former four states as the non-
experimental states and the latter two as the experimental states.  
The six states started to participate in QWI at different times. Therefore, instead of 
restricting the study to a fixed research period, I include all the information available before 1996. 
The cutoff is set at 1996 to avoid the confounding factors induced by the legislation of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (i.e., so-called welfare 
reform), which had a profound impact on employment among women in low-income households. 
Table 13 shows the data periods for each state. Among the six states, MD, WA and WI have the 
longest data history while CA has the shortest. 
I measure the impact of the FMLA on three sets of outcome variables. The first set of 
outcomes, employment and monthly wages (i.e., earnings), makes up a standard labor market 
measurement used in most labor studies. In QWI, these measurements are assessed as the 
number of employed workers and the corresponding monthly wage. One limitation of such 
measures is that they consist of a stock of existing workers. Thus, the effects of policy change on 
employment and wages are unlikely to occur instantly, but instead to develop gradually as the 
labor market moves toward a new equilibrium. For this reason, I focus on another two sets of 
outcomes that specify labor market flows.  
The second set of outcomes, the number of newly hired workers and the associated 
monthly starting salaries, reflects the flow of employment. Firms have relatively flexible control 
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over hiring decisions. If they believe that the mandate imposes a cost of hiring women of 
childbearing age, such as the cost of temporarily replacing leave-takers and the cost of providing 
health insurance for leave-takers, firms might adjust their hiring decisions accordingly. For 
example, firms might avoid hiring young women or incorporate a “wage penalty” into the 
starting salaries that are offered to young females. On the other hand, if the availability of the 
maternity leave attracts women whose labor supply might otherwise be constrained by binding 
family responsibilities, the firms will have a larger pool of candidates. Thus, firms might end up 
hiring more women of childbearing age, albeit at lower salaries. As previously stated, the QWI 
does not provide measures of hours worked, hence, the employment wages and starting salaries 
are measured by monthly rather than average hourly rates. 
The third set of variables also are flows, includes the number of workers separated from 
jobs and the number of workers recalled by the original employers. These variables are 
interesting because it is not unusual that pregnant women and new mothers leave jobs, 
voluntarily or non-voluntarily, absent maternity leave benefits and/or job protection. Since the 
most important feature of the FMLA is job-protection, the policy might reduce job separation 
among young women. However, it may also be true that the FMLA might lead to leave-takers 
deciding to quit jobs after taking family leave if they value staying at home more than working. 
The outcomes, job separations possibly accompanied by eventual recalls (rehires), provides 
insight into the effects of the FMLA.  
I restrict employment, new hires, and separations to be “stable” measurements that last 
for at least a whole quarter. This simple yet essential step mitigates the influence of seasonal and 
temporary change in employment which might confound the results. The new hire measurement 
differs from recalls in the sense that recalls refer to workers that are rehired by the original 
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employers while new hires include workers that were not employed by the same firms in the past 
four quarters. The labor market flows, new hires, separations, and recalls, are particularly 
suitable in the case of capturing the immediate impact of the policy change on labor demand and 
supply. 
I use the natural logarithm form for all of the outcome variables, and I add one to each 
value before taking logs in order to avoid extreme outliers when the original value is zero. Table 
14 presents the summary statistics for outcomes before taking logarithms. The unit of 
observation is at the demographic group-location-quarter level. Overall, there are 19 quarters, 9 
sex-and-age groups, and 273 counties. In the most narrowly defined data cells, i.e., observations 
based on few persons or establishments, the data are suppressed as missing values for 
confidentiality reasons. Such suppression only applies to counts, such as new hires, but not to 
continuous variables, such as the starting salaries.  
I divide the sample into three subgroups, one treatment group and two control groups. 
The treatment group includes women of childbearing age (aged 19-34). Their close counterparts 
are young men aged 19 to 34, who make up one of the control groups. I refer to the treatment 
group as “young women” and their male counterparts as “young men”. I also use a second 
control group, called “older women”, which contains female workers aged 35-64. The summary 
statistics of the three subgroups are listed in panel A, B, and C. 
 Comparing across the three subgroups, the employment and monthly wages of young 
women are consistently less than that of young men and older women. On average, there are less 
newly hired young women than young men, but there are more newly hired young women than 
older women. The starting salaries for young women are lower than that of both young men and 
older women. The number of separations for young women is smaller than that of young men, 
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but larger than that of older women. There are fewer young women being recalled compared to 
young men and older women.  
In the comparison between non-experimental states and experimental states, the former 
have more observations because they include more states. Wages and starting salaries of young 
women in experimental states are slightly lower than that of young women in non-experimental 
states. However, wages and starting salaries of young men in experimental states are higher than 
that of their counterparts in non-experimental states. For older women, they have higher wages in 
non-experimental states, but newly hired older women receive higher starting salaries in 
experimental states. The numbers of employment, new hires, and separations for the three 
subgroups are larger in non-experimental states. The numbers of recalls for young women and 
older women are lowers in non-experimental states but higher for young men in non-
experimental states. 
The six graphs in Figure 1 show the ratio of each outcome variable of the treated group to 
one of the two control groups, separated by experiment states, “exp”, and non-experimental 
states, “non-exp”. For example, the first curve in the first graph represents the ratio of 
employment of young women to young men in experimental states. These six graphs present the 
following evidence. First, while both new hires and employment fluctuate seasonally, the 
fluctuation in new hires is much more substantial than in employment. Second, the ratios of 
employment and new hires of young women to older women decline during the research period. 
Third, the ratios of the starting salaries of young women to the two control groups in non-
experimental states peaked at the time the FMLA was legislated. There is no such pattern in 
experimental states.  
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4. Empirical Analysis  
I take advantage of the legislation of the FMLA as a natural experiment to estimate its 
effects on young women’s labor market outcomes. I begin the analysis by setting up a difference-
in-difference (DD) model that uses two sources of variations-- time and geographic variations. 
The 1993 FMLA requires firms to provide maternity leave to eligible employees. Since some 
states had state-level maternity leave mandates before 1993 while others did not, I expect that the 
FMLA would have larger impacts on the latter states. Using such variations, the DD model 
identifies the difference between the changes in outcomes among young women for the 
experimental states and the non-experimental states before and after the 1993 FMLA. The 
sample is restricted to women of childbearing age, including those aged 19-34. The regression 
equation is as follows: 
ln	ሺ ௚ܻ௧ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݕݍ௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௚ ൅ ߚଷܨܯܮܣ௚௧ ൅ ߝ௚௧ 
The subscript g denotes each county, and t indicates each quarter-year. ݕݍ௧, and 
݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௚ are sets of dummies representing quarter-year fixed effects and county fixed effects. 
ܨܯܮܣ௚௧ is the policy variable which equals one if employees work in experimental states after 
1993. ߚଷ is the coefficient in interest which measures the effect of the FMLA. 
The DD estimates provide a baseline for the analysis. It allows a simple comparison for 
changes in labor outcomes for young women following passage of the FMLA in experimental 
states with young women in non-experimental (non-affected) states. However, the FMLA 
variable will not only capture the effects of the policy change, but also pick up labor market 
effects not controlled for but that are correlated with the adoption of the FMLA. Therefore, it 
may be preferable to include employees that do not use maternity leave benefits as the 
comparison group, and thus controls for labor market changes for young women as compared to 
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other workers that are not due to the FMLA. The difference between the treatment group and the 
control groups provide the third source of variation for a standard triple difference model. 
ln	ሺ ௗܻ௚௧ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݕݍ௧ ∗ ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௚ ൅ ߚଶݏ݁ݔܽ݃݁ௗ ∗ ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௚ ൅ ߚଷݏ݁ݔܽ݃݁ௗ ∗ ݕݍ௧
൅ ߚସܨܯܮܣௗ௚௧ ൅ ߝௗ௚௧ 
The subscript d denotes each sex-age groups, and ݏ݁ݔܽ݃݁ௗ are sets of dummies 
representing 16 sex-age groups. The inclusion of the three pair-wise intersections among quarter-
years, locations, and sex-age groups capture unobserved factors that might confound the causal 
effect of the policy change. ܨܯܮܣௗ௚௧, is the policy variable which equals one for women aged 
19-34 and work in experimental states after 1993. ߚସ is the coefficient of interest that measures 
the effect of the FMLA. 
The inclusion of these fixed effects controls for factors that vary across sex-age groups, 
counties, and quarter-years. For example, the interactions of demographic and county fixed 
effects capture the time invariant characteristics for workers in certain county, such as education, 
family structure, etc. If these characteristics vary across time, the interactions of quarter and 
county fixed effects or the interactions of demographic and quarter fixed effects are likely to pick 
up the changes. 
5. Results 
I present the DD estimates in Table 15. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
state level. The sample is restricted to women of childbearing age. The DD estimates compare 
the treatment effect of the FMLA on young women work in experimental states and non-
experimental states. The FMLA has a positive and insignificant effect on employment and new 
hires, while it has a negative and insignificant effect on wages of employment and starting 
salaries of hires. In addition, the FMLA has negative and insignificant effects on both separations 
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and recalls. It is a little surprising that the FMLA reduces separations while increases new hires. 
Intuitively, more separations imply more vacant positions and job openings, which result in more 
hires. In figure 2, I depict the trends of new hires and separations along the research period. Both 
variables are averaged by quarter. As expected, the trends of these two labor market outcomes 
generally move coordinately.  
The DD estimates only provide simple comparison between female workers in 
experimental states and non-experimental states. It is unlikely that the DD estimates reflect the 
causal effect of the FMLA because factors that are correlated with employment in experimental 
states after 1993 might confound the results. Therefore, I next turn to the triple difference 
estimates to explore the causal effect of the policy change on young women’s labor outcomes.  
Table 16 presents the estimates from the DDD model. Again, standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. The upper panel uses young men as the control group, while the lower 
panel uses older women as comparison. When using young men as the control group, I observe 
no evidence that the FMLA affects any of the labor market outcomes. The estimates for new 
hires and employment are negative yet insignificant, while the estimates for wages and starting 
salaries are positive and still insignificant. In addition, the FMLA has a positive and insignificant 
effect on separations, and it has a negative still insignificant effect on recalls. Although none of 
the estimates are statistically significant, it is not clear that the insignificant effects indicate true 
zero effects or are simply due to insufficient precision. Taking the number of new hires as an 
example, the point estimate is small and the standard error is six times the coefficient size. 
Therefore, with 95% confidence the true effect could lie in an interval between -0.038 and 0.032.  
Using older women as the control group, I again observe insignificant effects for most of 
the labor market outcomes. However, I find evidence that the legislation of the FMLA reduces 
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the starting salaries offered to young women by 2.5 percentage points. In addition, the estimate 
for recalls is positive and significant, indicating that the policy change increases recalls for 
young women by 3.9 percentage points. Comparing between panel A and panel B, half of the 
estimates flip signs when using different control groups. The magnitudes of coefficients and the 
associated standard errors also vary by using different comparison groups. The differences are 
likely due to imprecise estimation. I do not have strong priors as to which of the control groups is 
better suited for this research question. 
The idea of using labor market flows to measure the immediate impact of a policy change 
is desirable. However, most data sets available do not provide the information needed for such 
research design. The QWI contains labor market flow variables and was expected to be the most 
suitable data set among current available data. Unfortunately, it is not sufficiently powerful to 
produce informative results. 
6. Robustness check 
 To test the robustness of results, I replicate the triple difference estimates with falsified 
policy variables. In particular, I first remove the true experimental states, Idaho and Maryland, 
from the sample, and arbitrarily designate Wisconsin as the placebo experimental state. The 
remaining three, California, Oregon, and Washington, form the non-experimental states. The 
choice of states bundled together is based on geography and group size34. These placebo 
estimates are shown in Table 17. 
As expected, the placebo policy tests provide noisy estimate results. The magnitude of 
the estimates are sometimes much larger and sometimes much smaller than the original DDD 
results. Half of the estimates are significant. In addition, most coefficients have difference signs 
																																																								
34 Wisconsin has 12,172 observations, which is almost one third of the overall sample size. 
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compared to the original DDD estimates. The evidence suggests that the sample or the empirical 
approach may not be sufficient to provide reliable estimates for the impact of the FMLA. 
7. Conclusion 
Workplace mandated benefits are typically designed to help workers and/or mitigate 
market failures in the workplace (Summers 1989). However, nonwage benefits might have 
consequences on employment and wages, both predictable and unintended, due to the costs of 
providing them. Empirical examination of the effects of mandated benefits is difficult because 
most data sets available are incapable of identifying small and immediate changes for labor 
demand and supply. Existing studies on such topics usually use the Current Population Survey, 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and the Decennial Census data. However, these data 
sets either have small individual-level sample sizes or have a prolonged interval between waves. 
In addition to data limitations, a more fundamental issue is that employment and wages respond 
to policy change gradually. Therefore, the literature provides limited knowledge on the effects of 
mandated benefit on labor market outcomes. 
This paper seeks to investigate the effects of the FMLA on young women’s labor market 
outcomes using data from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators. I pay particular attention to the 
immediate impact of the policy change that is measured by labor market flows, including the 
number of new hires and the starting salaries, as well as the numbers of job separations and 
recalls. Unlike stock variables such as employment and wages, labor market flows reflect the 
immediate changes in labor demand and supply, thus they are potentially more informative 
measuring the effects of the FMLA. In triple difference estimations with young men as the 
control group, I find no evidence that the FMLA has a significant effect on young women’s labor 
market outcomes. When using older women as the comparison group, I find significant evidence 
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that the policy reduces the starting salaries offered to young women, and it increases recalls 
among them. Using young men as the comparison group provided very different results. And a 
placebo test produced coefficients and levels of significance that were as large or larger than the 
FMLA results. 
The impreciseness and inconsistency of evidence is likely due to insufficient detailed data 
and the small number of “treated” groups coupled with a relatively small number of untreated 
control states. Although the QWI contains labor market flow variables, it has several 
shortcomings that hinder precise estimation. As in early 1990s, only six states reported 
information in the QWI, and two small states, ID and MD, form the group of experimental states. 
The pre-FMLA period is also short. As shown in Table 13, the earliest data are recorded in the 
second quarter of 1991, which is only nine quarters before the legislation of the FMLA. In 
addition, it is impossible to exclude workers from establishments uncovered by the FMLA. The 
QWI data set has no information on firm size, which is a crucial criterion for FMLA coverage. 
Moreover, the QWI payroll variables are averaged monthly but not hourly. Thus, worker and 
employer decisions on working hours independent of the FMLA might affect hiring and starting 
salaries. 
Despite the inherent deficiencies in the analysis, my approach is of some importance in 
various ways. For policy purposes, it is necessary to examine how workplace mandates affect 
labor market outcomes. Understanding the effects of past policies, such as the FMLA, provides 
insights into policies that are currently under discussion, such as paid maternity leave programs 
and the extension of the current FMLA. In addition, the idea of using labor market flows to 
capture the immediate impact of a policy change can be applied to estimating the effects of a 
broad range of mandates that shift labor demand and supply.  
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8. Tables and figures 
Table 12 Maternal Leave Legislation by individual states 
State Weeks of Leaves Level Date of Enforcement 
California 17 State Jan. 1992 
Oregon 12 State Jan. 1988 
Washington 12 State Sept. 1989 
Wisconsin 6 State Apr. 1988 
Idaho 12 Federal Aug. 1993 
Maryland 12 Federal Aug. 1993 
Data source: Baum (2003).    
 
 
Table 13 Data periods by states. 
  Data period 
California 1992Q4-1995Q4 
Idaho 1992Q2-1995Q4 
Maryland 1991Q2-1995Q4 
Oregon 1992Q2-1995Q4 
Washington 1991Q2-1995Q4 
Wisconsin 1991Q2-1995Q4 
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Table 14 Summary statistics for labor market outcomes 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Obs. Mean Std. Dev
Panel A: treatment group -young women     
Non-Experimental 
States       
Experimental 
States   
Employment 10151 3548 16571 3297 1851 5460 
Employment wage 10189 997 428 3329 970 343 
New hires 9981 456 1799 3145 250 607 
Starting salaries 10080 801 832 3217 795 257 
Separations 9975 490 2022 3162 312 842 
Recalls 9672 159 613 3033 171 508 
Panel B: control group 1 -young men     
Non-Experimental 
States       
Experimental 
States   
Employment 10179 4244 21138 3333 2012 5848 
Employment wage 10197 1476 509 3301 1491 520 
New hires 9980 531 2255 3201 269 674 
Starting salaries 10110 1172 360 3222 1218 411 
Separations 10013 569 2506 3205 336 915 
Recalls 9793 240 929 3114 199 566 
Panel C: control group 2 -older women     
Non-Experimental 
States       
Experimental 
States   
Employment 10206 4554 17724 3345 2302 5619 
Employment wage 10209 1389 383 3348 1319 371 
New hires 9913 305 1230 3093 160 396 
Starting salaries 10086 894 293 3206 911 336 
Separations 10012 383 1551 3156 260 659 
Recalls 9705 165 644 3083 182 495 
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Table 15 Double difference estimates of the effects of the FMLA on young women.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Ln(NH) Ln(NH salaries) Ln(separation) Ln(recalls) Ln(emp.) Ln(wages) 
FMLA 0.0105 -0.00935 -0.0719 -0.0951 0.0147 -0.0113 
(0.0143) (0.0152) (0.0853) (0.0893) (0.0401) (0.0219) 
Obs. 13,126 13,297 13,137 12,705 13,137 12,705 
R-squared 0.923 0.337 0.917 0.872 0.872 0.275 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are robust and clustered at state level. Sample are 
restricted to young women aged 19-34. To save space, I use abbreviations for some the outcomes. NH 
stands for new hires, NH salaries stands for starting salaries for new hires, and emp. for employment. 
 
 
Table 16 Triple difference estimates of the causal effect of the FMLA on young women. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Ln(NH) Ln(NH salaries) Ln(separations) Ln(recalls) Ln(emp.) Ln(wages) 
Control 1- young men           
FMLA -0.00303 0.00217 0.00605 -0.0203 -0.00180 0.0113 
(0.0178) (0.00897) (0.0304) (0.0244) (0.0181) (0.00605) 
Obs. 26,307 26,629 26,355 25,612 26,960 27,016 
R-squared 0.991 0.847 0.991 0.979 0.998 0.954 
Control 2- older women           
FMLA -0.0510 -0.0247** 0.0615 0.0392*** 0.00494 0.000587 
(0.0305) (0.00810) (0.0352) (0.00518) (0.0474) (0.0220) 
Obs. 26,132 26,589 26,305 25,493 26,999 27,075 
R-squared 0.989 0.721 0.990 0.978 0.998 0.951 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are robust and clustered at state level. The 
treatment group consists young women aged 19-34. The upper panel uses young men aged 19-34 as the 
control group, while the lower panel uses older women aged 35-64 as the comparison. Estimations 
include quarter fixed effects, county fixed effects, demographic fixed effects, and the pairwise interaction 
among them. To save space, I use abbreviations for some the outcomes. NH stands for new hires, NH 
salaries stands for starting salaries for new hires, and emp. for employment. 
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Table 17 Triple difference estimates of the effect of the FMLA from state group placebo policies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Ln(NH) Ln(NH salaries) Ln(separations) Ln(recalls) Ln(emp) Ln(wages) 
Control 1- young men           
FMLA -0.0314 -0.00974* -0.0710*** 0.00500 -0.0528** -0.00656 
(0.0282) (0.00392) (0.00532) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0100) 
Obs. 19,961 20,190 19,988 19,465 20,330 20,386 
R-squared 0.992 0.855 0.991 0.979 0.998 0.956 
Control 2- old women           
FMLA -0.0550** 0.00726 -0.0423 -0.0103 -0.0525** 0.0232* 
(0.0137) (0.00647) (0.0274) (0.00799) (0.0157) (0.00816) 
Obs. 19,894 20,166 19,987 19,377 20,357 20,398 
R-squared 0.990 0.734 0.990 0.977 0.999 0.953 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are robust and clustered at state level. The placebo 
tests replace the experimental states with Wisconsin, while the non-experimental states include California, 
Oregon, and Washington. Estimations include quarter fixed effects, county fixed effects, demographic 
fixed effects, and the pairwise interaction among them. To save space, I use abbreviations for some the 
outcomes. NH stands for new hires, NH salaries stands for starting salaries for new hires, and emp. for 
employment. 
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Figure 1 Ratio of labor market outcomes between demographic groups 
  
  
  
Note: Each curve represents a ratio of one labor market outcome between young women and young men/ 
older women, separated by experimental and non-experimental states. 
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Figure 2  Trends of new hires and separations along the research period. 
 
Note: The two curves represent the changes in new hires and separations along the research period. Each 
variable is averaged by quarter. 
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APPENDIX A  
Table 18  Summary Statistics for three samples, all estimates are weighted using the child's sampling 
weight 
  Main Sample Extended Sample Comparison Sample
(N=16,535) (N=34,939) (N=15,602) 
Mean Mean Mean 
Children's Info 
BMI z-score 0.28 0.35 0.24 
Overweight 0.27 0.29 0.27 
Obesity 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Height is self-report 0.51 0.51 0.38 
Weight is self-report 0.53 0.53 0.4 
Family size, less than 3 persons 0.09 0.22 0.21 
Family size, 4 persons 0.36 0.39 0.37 
Family size, 5 or more persons 0.55 0.39 0.42 
Family income, $1000 60.58 61.56 42.89 
Child's age, in year 12.02 11.82 10.67 
Child is Hispanic 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Child is African American 0.15 0.15 0.19 
Attachment to father 0.77 0.77 0.72 
Child is female 0.49 0.48 0.48 
High birth weight 0.1 0.11 0.1 
Breastfed 0.57 0.54 0.45 
Mother's Info. 
Edu.,less than high school 0.12 0.11 0.19 
Edu.,high school graduate 0.44 0.44 0.52 
Edu.,some college 0.23 0.24 0.22 
Edu.,college degree or higher 0.21 0.21 0.08 
Mother's age 36.64 38.04 32.69 
AFQT score (2006 standard) 47.64 47.23 39.47 
Married, live with spouse 0.73 0.7 0.66 
Mothers' Employment 
Fraction of weeks worked in past month 0.65 0.69 0.65 
Hours worked per week in past month, in unit 10 2.32 2.56 2.39 
Fraction of weeks worked in past year 0.65 0.7 0.65 
Hours worked per week in past year, in unit 10 2.32 2.59 2.39 
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